Thomas Brent Mayr

Brent Mayr is the managing share holder of Mayr Law, P.C. based in Houston. He is Board Certified in Criminal Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. He is a former briefing attorney to Judge Barbara Hervey on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and former Assistant District Attorney for the Harris County District Attorney’s Office. He is co-chair of the TCDLA Ethics Committee and a member of the Board of Directors of the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association.

Ethics and the Law: Ethical Issues Dealing with an Incompetent Client

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At one point or another, you will be faced with a client with a mental condition that raises an issue as to whether they are competent. The constitutional standard for competency to stand trial asks whether the defendant has a sufficient present ability to consult with their lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether they have a rational as well as factual under‑ standing of the proceedings against them.1

Often times, there are going to be cases where there is no doubt about the client’s competency or lack thereof. But what about the close cases? Even more difficult, what about the client who is adamant that they are competent when there is evidence to suggest otherwise? Or the client whose mental illness impairs their ability to make critical choices about their case?

These specific scenarios raise numerous ethical questions that are not easy to address or answer. These include, in no particular order, questions about the duty of loyalty, the duty of candor to the court, and the need to maintain confidentiality.

Don’t Go Runnin’ to the Court (Except for Funding)

When confronted with a client — appointed or retained — who appears to lack that fundamental “reason‑ able degree of rational understanding,” it is important for criminal defense lawyers to first embrace one of our most fundamental obligations: maintaining the confidences of the client. This is critical to developing an effective defensive strategy, while ensuring that the client’s rights are protected.

Many times, we see where lawyers, upon learning that the client has some mental illness or appears to have some mental illness, immediately notify the court (which inevitably places the State on notice) of what they have learned in their discussions with their client about their possible mental impairment. This is presumably due to the requirements set out in Article 46B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Triggering those statutory requirements, however, may either not be necessary or punitive to the client. For instance, if a client is released on bond but is found to be incompetent and ordered to be transferred to a mental hospital, that is a substantial restriction on their freedom. Even worse, it is typically not due to any conscious choice or decision on their part. The more prudent course of action is utilizing an ex‑ pert that operates under the umbrella of the attorney‑client relationship and is able to consult with both the client and the attorney confidentially about the client’s mental condition. If you are appointed to represent a client or the client does not have the funds to retain a forensic psychologist, you should first file an ex parte motion for the assistance of an expert pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma to evaluate the client before going to the court and invoking the procedures set out in Article 46B.004. You want to be careful to include enough information to get the court to approve the funding (e.g. “funding is needed for the appointment of a psychologist to help assist counsel evaluate any possible mental conditions and their impact on the defendant’s role in the alleged offense”), but not blatantly “suggest” the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial so as not to trigger the requirements of Article 46B.

All this is consistent with newly implemented Rule 1.16 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct titled “Clients with Diminished Capacity.” This rule, which upon closer inspection was obviously in‑ tended to apply to clients in the context of non‑criminal settings, nevertheless encourages lawyers to rely on others to “protect the client” with diminished capacity.2

This course of action is also preferable because it allows you to rely on an expert in the field of psychology to support or dispel any belief you as the criminal defense lawyer may have about the client’s mental capacity and ability to consult with you, rather than have to make those difficult determinations on your own.

To Disclose or Not Disclose?

Once you have the insight and opinion from your psychological expert regarding your client’s mental capacity, the next ethical conflict deals with whether there is an ethical obligation to disclose that information to the court and the prosecutor.

Again, as discussed previously, upon the court being presented with a suggestion that the defendant is incompetent, the court is required to take certain steps including appointing a “disinterested expert” to examine the defendant and report on their competency. In certain circumstances, however, a finding of incompetency could result in further harm to the client. What, if any, ethical obligation is there to disclose the fact that a defendant does not possess the required mental capacity to understand the proceedings against them? What happens when, for instance, during a plea colloquy, the court inquires of the attorney whether they believe the defendant is competent to enter their plea?

Rules 3.03 and 3.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct speak about, as titled, “Candor Toward the Tribunal” and “Fairness in Adjudicatory Proceedings,” but, like other rules, give little explicit guidance with how to deal with a situation like this. Comment 1 to Rule 3.03 makes it clear that “The advocate’s task is to present the client’s case with persuasive force.” However, “[p]erformance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal.”

In some cases, disclosing the client’s incompetency to the prosecutor can be beneficial. Once the prosecutor realizes the possible impediment they face to prosecuting the defendant, a prosecutor might be compelled to dismiss the charges or offer an alternate resolution that does not require a plea or a trial. However, what happens when the disclosure has the opposite effect? Instead of agreeing to dismiss the charge, the prosecutor could insist on commitment or other harsh alternative to try and restore the defendant’s competency. In the federal criminal justice system, for instance, upon a finding of incompetency, the court “shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General” who “shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility.”3 What if the defendant is released on bond (as is the presumption in federal cases) and suffers from an intellectual disability that cannot be treated with medication or therapy? One can see the harmful and cruel consequence that comes from disclosing the client’s incompetency in that scenario.

Again, there is no clear guidance from the Rules, their commentary, or any Ethics Opinion with how to make these determinations.

Who Gets to Call the Shots?

Only adding to these dilemmas, what happens when the client’s lack of competency or other mental impairment leads them to make choices that you, as the criminal defense lawyer, knows is not in the best interest of the client. For instance, what if the client does not want to be found incompetent even though your expert and your diligent review of that expert’s opinion leads you to conclude otherwise?

In the Preamble to the Rules, in the Section titled, “A Lawyer’s Responsibilities,” it states generally, “In all professional functions, a lawyer should zealously pursue client’s interests within the bounds of the law.” Comment 6 to Rule 1.01 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, states,

Having accepted employment, a lawyer should act with competence, commitment and dedication to the interest of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer should feel a moral or professional obligation to pursue a matter on behalf of a client with reasonable diligence and promptness despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer.

That is a lot of power and responsibility for us as lawyers to assume. But what about the role the client plays in the attorney‑client relationship?

Rule 1.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct sets out limits for both the lawyer and the client. The Rule starts with the mandatory provisions where the client has the ultimate power to make decisions. As they relate to us as criminal defense lawyers, a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions (a) “concerning the objectives and general methods of representation,” and (b) after consultation with the lawyer, “as to the plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.” The Rule then continues with the exceptions, which provide, among other things, that “A lawyer may limit the scope, objectives and general methods of the representation if the client consents after consultation.” Comment 1 to the Rule explains the interplay between the role of both the client and the attorney:

Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of representation. The client has ultimate authority to determine the objectives to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law, the lawyer’s professional obligations, and the agreed scope of representation. Within those limits, a client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the general methods to be used in pursuing those objectives. The lawyer should assume responsibility for the means by which the client’s objectives are best achieved. Thus, a lawyer has very broad discretion to deter‑ mine technical and legal tactics, subject to the client’s wishes regarding such matters as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected.

One must ask themselves whether these same principles apply to a client who is incompetent. In McCoy v. Louisiana, ‑‑ U.S. ‑‑, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 200 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2018), the Supreme Court held that the defendant in that case had absolute control over the decision to admit guilt despite his lawyer “reasonably assess[ing] a concession of guilt as best suited to avoid the death penalty.”4 This decision by the client was sacrosanct despite the client being “an unruly client” who “faced a strong government case.”5 It is worth noting, however, that the Court considered that the trial court “had determined that McCoy was competent to stand trial.”6

This is where the first step in dealing with a potentially incompetent client — obtaining a psychological expert to assist in your defense — can be of assistance. By having your own expert with their own observations of your client’s mental capacity, it will be easier to justify the decisions that you as the lawyer make to accomplish what is in the client’s best interests. In other words, if some mental illness is affecting the client’s ability to make certain decisions about the case, from an ethical perspective, it will help you making those decisions when you have the input from an expert in that field to weigh in and support your decisions.

However, there are always going to be situations where you must weigh the client’s autonomy and ability to decide for themselves what is in their best interest. In this regard, it is important to note that competency is not always clear and distinguishable. While a client’s mental illness may impede their ability to make certain decisions such as whether to plead guilty or not, they may possess enough capacity to set out what their objective is.

Even though the court’s assessment of a defendant’s competency to stand trial is a black and white determination, competency exists in degrees.7 A client may be competent enough to participate in a murder trial and yet that same client may not be competent to stand trial for a complicated financial conspiracy case. A client may be able to understand the roles of the actors in the court room and yet think aliens are coming to testify against him. As Justice Blackmun once stated, “Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to comptency for another purpose.”8

When addressing the court’s inquiry, keep in mind the continuum that competency exists on; then deter‑ mine whether for the purposes of the case the client is competent to proceed with trial, such that they can understand the charges against them, the roles of court officers, and be able to assist in their defense to the degree that their participation is required.

Conclusion

Dealing with a client with mental illness that lacks competency undoubtedly presents a criminal defense attorney with numerous ethical dilemmas. Only complicating matters is the lack of clear guidance from the Rules and their commentary, as well as differing perspectives as to what the attorney’s role is when representing an incompetent client. To help navigate this difficult territory, it is always best to have a psychological expert to assist both the attorney and the client. But one must be prepared — and well read on this issue — in order to ensure that the attorney is not only complying with the law, but their ethical obligations as well.

As always, the TCDLA Ethics Committee is here ready to advise and assist you with these ethical dilemmas.

Ethics and the Law: Sharing the Wealth – What You Need to Know About Shared Fees and Referrals

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The majority of us have been there. If you haven’t, it will come soon enough (pay attention young lawyers).

We are criminal defense lawyers. No one needs us until they need us. And when they need us, they really need us. For many people who find themselves with that need, they may only know the lawyer who, for example, took care of their divorce or handled their uncle’s personal injury case. They think any lawyer can handle a criminal case, so they call that lawyer first.

Of course, those lawyers may know nothing about handling a criminal case or simply don’t want to handle the case. But, there is something that catches their interest.

They see a client in need — a need that is typically unlike one they have seen with other clients — and they see that the client is willing to spend whatever amount of money it takes to get them out of the trouble they’ve found themselves in. Rather than focus on meeting that need, the lawyer cannot help but see a financial opportunity.

So, the lawyer calls you, a buddy from law school who is a top‑notch criminal defense lawyer, and lays it on you: “I’ve got a person looking for a criminal defense lawyer. I want to send them your way, but I need a referral fee.”

I scratch your back, you scratch mine, right? Quid pro quo. These are concepts as old as time. And, back in the “good old days,” paying what was referred to as a “naked referral fee” was a common and acceptable practice.

That all changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s as part of a push to maintain professionalism within our line of work with, among other things, the adoption of Rule 1.04(f) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.1 The current version of that Rule provides:

f. A division or arrangement for division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

    1. the division is:
      1. in proportion to the professional services performed by each lawyer; or
      2. made between lawyers who assume joint responsibility for the representation; and
    2. the client consents in writing to the terms of the arrangement prior to the time of the association or referral proposed, including:
      1. the identity of all lawyers or law firms who will participate in the fee‑sharing agreement, and
      2. whether fees will be divided based on the proportion of services performed or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and
      3. the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be made; and
    3. the aggregate fee does not violate paragraph (a).
    1.  

In sum, there are three key elements of a shared fee: (1) proportional or joint responsibility, (2) client consent, and (3) the total fee must be reasonable. More simply, you cannot accept or pay a referral fee to another lawyer (or non‑lawyer for that matter) for referring you a case nor can you require or request a lawyer to pay a referral fee for simply referring you a case.

So, with this in mind, you politely tell the lawyer, unless they are willing to associate with you on the case, share a proportion of the work or joint responsibility, and the client consents to the sharing of a reasonable fee for the work, you cannot pay them a referral fee. What happens then, when the lawyer replies by telling you, “Well then, how about we agree to refer each other cases? I’ll send you any calls I get for criminal matters and you send me all your calls for family law cases.” How does this comport with the Disciplinary Rules?

The recent amendments to the Disciplinary Rules last year addressed this very scenario and put some serious limits on it. Rule 7.03 added subsection (e)(2) which provides the following:

(2) A lawyer may refer clients to another lawyer or a nonlawyer professional pursuant to an agreement not otherwise prohibited under these Rules that provides for the other person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer, if:

    1. the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive;
    2. clients are informed of the existence and nature of the agreement; and
    3. the lawyer exercises independent professional judgment in making referrals.

Under this new Rule, the lawyer’s proposal could work as a viable alternative. The problem, however, are the absolutes: “any calls I get for criminal matter” and “all your calls for family law cases.” As the Rule states, the agreement cannot be exclusive. Further, there must be assurances (in writing) from both attorneys that they will inform clients of the “existence and nature of the agreement.” To properly operate under this new Rule, it is best to have a list of lawyers that, based on your independent professional judgment, are fit to handle a particular matter that you can provide to a potential client.

Say then, for instance, the lawyer finally says, “Look, I get what you’re saying. I don’t want to lose my bar license over this. I’m going to give the client your name and number. Just take good care of them.” Do the Rules absolutely prohibit you from giving that lawyer anything of value for referring you the client?

Rule 7.03(e) states that, while a lawyer cannot “pay, give, or offer to pay or give anything of value to a person not licensed to practice law for soliciting or referring prospective clients for professional employment,” the Rule does explicitly create an exception for “nominal gifts given as an expression of appreciation that are neither intended nor reasonably expected to be a form of compensation for recommending a lawyer’s services.” Although this Rule refers to a person “not licensed to practice law,” it is reasonable to interpret the Rule to permit giving nominal gifts such as a gift certificate or event tickets to that lawyer for referring you the potential client.

The bottom line is that we should be focused on providing quality legal representation to clients and, when we cannot provide those services ourselves, making sure they are referred to good lawyers who can do so. It should not be about the money. As Robert Pelton once wrote, “If the other attorney gets hired and collects a handsome fee, good for the other attorney. I consider the referral a ‘gift’ to the other attorney for which I expect nothing in return (nor will I accept anything in return), and I make the referral based only upon my confidence in that attorney’s abilities.” No one can doubt that is good advice to follow.

Stay ethical my friends.

Blinded Justice: Lessons Learned from Trying a Case via Zoom

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On a Thursday morning, we logged into Zoom like it was any other day. For months, Zoom had been used, like in many other settings, to keep court operations running. There in the gallery view on our computer monitors were cameras facing the well of the court with counsel tables, the judge, and a spattering of other attorneys logging in for morning docket. But this was not just a regular docket. The day before, six people were selected to sit as a jury in a trial. Our trial.

I unmuted my microphone and pointed out to the judge — who had already overruled every objection I had made about the proceedings leading up to that moment — what I thought was a simple oversight: “Your Honor, I see they are setting up a camera facing the witness stand but I don’t see a camera facing the jury.” Her response, “I’m not putting a camera on the jury since we’re live-streaming this. I don’t want their faces shown in the live-stream.” In my mind, I thought, what difference would it make since the jurors were wearing masks? But I had already toed the line on being held in contempt and was not about to face the prospect of being jailed during the pandemic. I politely asked, “How will we be able to see the jury then, your Honor?” The judge replied, “You are welcome to come down here and be present in the courtroom, but I am not going to put a camera on the jury.”

And so began a jury trial where a defendant and we as his attorneys — who refused to put ourselves at risk of contracting a deadly virus for which there is no vaccine and no studies to show the long term effects — were faced with no other choice but to appear for trial by Zoom. And for the entire trial, we would be blind. Unable to see the jury that would be judging us and our client. The jury would be in the courtroom, along with the judge, the witnesses, and the prosecutors. Myself, my associate, Sierra Tabone, and our client would appear on television monitors in the courtroom. And so, began an abomination.

COVID-19 and OCA’s “Experiment”

Our client was charged with driving while intoxicated back in December of 2018. Delays in obtaining evidence from the prosecutors and then the State having to retest our client’s blood contributed to multiple delays, and the case was not scheduled for its first trial setting until January 2020. The case was not reached and ultimately rescheduled to April.

But by then, the COVID-19 pandemic had set in. Government officials had made declarations of disasters and declared states of emergencies. The judicial system followed suit with the Texas Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals issuing Emergency Orders that grinded the judicial system to a halt. The wheels of justice, however, could not come to a complete stop for too long, and judges throughout the state scrambled to figure out how to get those wheels turning again.

One of the first solutions was to use Zoom or some other videoconferencing application. Although awkward at first, it turned out to be a workable stopgap. Courts resumed holding non-trial dockets where attorneys for the State and the defense would confer with the courts to determine case status and discuss other issues.

As for jury trials, however, those obviously could not resume. So, like for our client, many defendants had to wait for their day in court. All that would change at the end of June when the Supreme Court issued its Eighteenth Emergency Order Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster. In that order, it laid out an ambitious plan to have the Office of Court Administration (“OCA”) coordinate with Regional Presiding Judges and local administrative judges to “assist trial courts in conducting a limited number of jury proceedings prior to September 1.”1 These limited numbers of “test trials” had to

  1. be at the request of the judge presiding over the case;
  2. ensure adequate social distancing and other restrictions and precautions [were] taken to ensure the health and safety of court staff, parties, attorneys, jurors, and the public;
  3. take all reasonable steps to protect the parties’ constitutional and statutory rights;
  4. require the admonishment of petit jurors as appropriate to ensure that proper attention is given by each juror and that outside influence is removed; and
  5. permit the OCA to observe the processes used during the proceeding in order for the OCA to prepare a report to submit to the Supreme Court and to develop best practices for other courts’ use.2

A number of judges around the State jumped at the opportunity to get their dockets moving again and requested to hold jury trials.3 OCA approved a total of 85 requests to hold jury trials and so began the “great experiment.”4

While several of the cases were ultimately resolved without the need for a trial, a total of twenty jury trials were held throughout the state.5 As required by the Supreme Court’s order, the OCA observed those proceedings, prepared and submitted its report to the Court, and made a number of recommendations for allowing courts to move forward with jury trials between October 1 and December 31.6

Surprisingly, not mentioned anywhere in the OCA’s report was an account of an alarming incident that occurred with two trial proceedings that took place in Brazos County.

On August 17, the Honorable Steve Smith, Presiding Judge of the 361st Judicial District Court of Brazos County, started a jury trial in a criminal case where the defendant was accused of burglary. At or about that same time, the Honorable Kyle Hawthorne, Presiding Judge of the 85th Judicial District Court of Brazos County, located across the hall from Judge Smith’s court, started a jury trial in a criminal case where the defendant was accused of continuous family violence assault. Both trials were on the OCA’s approved jury trial list and presumably followed the directives set out in the Supreme Court’s Eighteenth Emergency Order to limit the transmission of COVID-19 in these “test trials.”

While both trials apparently commenced with little difficulty, something went terribly wrong on August 18. As reported by a local television station and newspaper, Judge Hawthorne had to declare a mistrial after it was discovered that a COVID-19 positive inmate was accidentally transported to the courthouse along with the defendant in trial before him.7 That other inmate: the defendant in trial before Judge Smith.8 Judge Smith ultimately had to call for a two-week recess of the punishment phase in that trial.9

In the OCA’s report to the Supreme Court, this was all that was reflected regarding those two trials:

And even though the OCA’s report had a date-by-date account of significant events related to its “pilot program,” this incident was surprisingly omitted from their report.

The OCA nevertheless made its recommendations to resume in-person jury trials and, based on these recommendations, on September 18, the Supreme Court  issued its Twenty-Sixth Emergency Order Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster allowing for in-person jury trials to commence following the recommendations set out by the OCA.10

The Dreaded E-Mail and the Decision to Withdraw

Because the Supreme Court’s Twenty-Sixth Emergency Order had not yet been released, our case, which had a trial setting on September 16, was rescheduled to November 11, 2020. We began anticipating and preparing for trial but awaited further instruction from the judge in our case, the Honorable Toria Finch, Presiding Judge for Harris County Criminal Court at Law No. 9, to determine if she was going to follow the Supreme Court’s directives regarding in-person jury trial proceedings as other judges in Harris County were beginning to do.

On October 21, we received an email from the judge informing us that she intended to start trial on November 11 and our case was number one on the list. The judge also informed us that the trials were to commence as scheduled following the court’s safety plan as well as the plan created by the Harris County Judiciary.

Myself and my associate reviewed the court’s safety plan and we both had concerns. First, the plan specified that witnesses would not be required to wear masks and would be placed behind a Plexiglass barrier which we knew not be effective at containing the spread of the virus.11 We were also concerned that the plan allowed for the judge to ask any person before the court to remove their masks if needed to make a proper record. We were also concerned that, if the trial took more than one day, the plan did not account for what trial participants, including jurors, would be doing when they were not in the courtroom and returned home where they were not subject to the protections in the safety plan.

Right about that time, our fears were validated when we learned about another incident in Beaumont. As reported by a Beaumont news station, in Jefferson County’s first jury trial since the COVID-19 pandemic began, a juror in a criminal case tested positive for COVID-19 requiring the judge in that case to declare a mistrial.12

Approximately one week later, on October 28, it was reported that health care officials and government leaders were “pleading with Houstonians: Act now to prevent, or at least minimize, a third wave of infections across Greater Houston” that had developed over the previous weeks.13

By that point, we felt we had to move for a continuance. Aside from our personal concerns for our health and safety, we were concerned how proceeding to trial would infringe upon our client’s constitutional rights at trial. Hence, on October 29, we filed our motion for continuance modeled largely on the TCDLA COVID-19 Task Force’s motion for continuance.

Prior to presenting it to the judge, however, we began to prepare ourselves for the judge to deny the motion. That meant we had to begin to consider our obligations to our client and whether we could still effectively and, more importantly, ethically represent him if we were forced to trial on November 11.

 Rule 1.06(b) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct states, “a lawyer shall not represent a person if the representation of that person . . . reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited by . . . the lawyer’s . . . own interests.”14 As the comments to the rule state, “Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”15 And, when “an impermissible conflict of interest . . . arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer must take effective action to eliminate the conflict, including withdrawal if necessary to rectify the situation.”16

What myself and my associate concluded after much consideration was that we had to put our own interests in our personal health and safety above that of our client and his case and potentially withdraw due to the conflict of interest.

We held out hope, however, and made our case to the judge at a pretrial conference on November 4, which ironically was held by Zoom. After presenting our arguments, as anticipated, the judge denied the motion and indicated to the parties that we were to appear at the NRG Arena for jury selection on November 11. We then expressed to her our ethical concerns and the possibility of withdrawal. Despite not having made a formal motion, the judge quickly replied that she would be inclined to deny that motion.17 In terms of reasonable alternatives to allay our fears, we asked if the judge would consider requiring all trial participants to submit to diagnostic tests prior to appearing for the trial or even possibly holding the trial in an outdoor venue. Again, denied.

After several difficult discussions with our client, we informed him that we had to move to withdraw and did so on Tuesday, November 10. Expecting the judge to deny that motion, however, I had spent the entire weekend before preparing a petition for writ of mandamus. While I had seen other attempts at mandamus fail based on a denial of a motion for continuance, I felt we had a better shot because ours was based on the failure of the judge to let us withdraw. Caselaw clearly established that mandamus relief was appropriate where a trial court refused to allow an attorney burdened by an actual conflict of interest to withdraw.18

The petition was filed and assigned to the First District Court of Appeals in Houston that Tuesday afternoon at 2:51 p.m. along with a motion to order a temporary stay of the proceedings in the county criminal court at law. At 4:20 p.m., we received an email from the Court of Appeals notifying us that our motion for the temporary stay was denied.

We were overwhelmed with a feeling of defeat. Again, we had seen other cases where parties moved for and were denied a continuance, including a case involving a tax dispute in Scurry County where the lead counsel for one of the parties sought a continuance due to his age and underlying health conditions, and because his physician had directed him to self-quarantine for at least twelve weeks. He sought mandamus relief to the Eastland Court of Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court, both of which denied his request without opinions.19 We had heard of other attorneys throughout the state and in Harris County whose motions for continuance and petitions for mandamus relief were also summarily denied. The evidence was there to support a strong inference that although there was no explicit directive, there was tacit direction from the top down to deny any motions and overrule any objections that would delay the proceedings.

It was then that we realized we were no longer operating by the same system of rules and protections we have. Although the Texas Supreme Court had stated, “The Constitution is not suspended when the government declares a state of disaster,” the actions of every court in Texas demonstrated the exact opposite.20 We knew we had to shift the paradigm and adapt to our situation.

We could not just show up and participate in person as it would have been counter to everything we had represented to both the trial court and appeals court. We were not going to participate in the trial.

The judge had given us an option: we could appear by Zoom. Instinctively, it sounded like a good solution because it resolved what, in our minds, was our primary concern: our personal health and safety. But almost instantaneously, we were equally concerned with the multiple constitutional violations that it would involve.

First and foremost, it would deprive our client of his constitutional right to be physically present at his trial.21 Although the judge had said it was our choice to appear by Zoom, it was really a “Hobson’s choice” because the alternative was that our client would be deprived both of his right to conflict-free representation and effective assistance of counsel.22 There was also the fact that our client would be giving up his constitutional right to physically face those who testify against him.23 Effective assistance of counsel would also be compromised simply because we would not be in the courtroom to witness everything that was taking place. The list just seemed to go on and on.

Because we were faced with a true “Hobson’s choice,” we decided to move forward as intended and not be physically present at trial but instead appear by Zoom while making all the necessary objections to preserve the error for appeal.

Voir Dire and Preparing the Jury to See Us on Zoom

The morning of November 11, we had to appear at NRG Arena — a convention hall located next to NRG Stadium and the old Astrodome site that had been converted to a massive jury assembly hall — because there was no indication that the voir dire rooms were equipped for Zoom. That was indeed the case when we arrived.  While the county had not provided that sort of technology, we heard the sound of cash registers ringing as we walked in and saw large numbers of staff to assist jurors and parties, as well as high-end audio and video equipment. This included individual voice-activated microphones and Sony headsets at each “juror station,” a seat for each veniremember spaced six feet apart from the others. For us, we too would wear headsets to be able to listen to everyone speaking, be it the judge, the prosecutors, or the veniremembers responding. Hearing would have been otherwise been impossible given the cavernous space that we occupied.

Our concerns about our health and safety were not as great as they were for the actual trial proceedings that would take place the following day at the Harris County Criminal Justice Center in the courtroom for County Criminal Court at Law No. 9. Veniremembers wore not only face masks, but county-provided plastic face shields. Staff members came through before and after voir dire spraying down equipment with what appeared to be disinfectant. Sanitizer sessions were spread out throughout the venue.

As expected, Judge Finch was not there but instead, like other courts using NRG, used a visiting judge to conduct the voir dire proceedings.

As the veniremembers filed into the room, we realized the first problem. While we had questionnaires for each, we had no idea what they looked like. Wearing the masks was bad enough, but with the face shields which just reflected the ceiling lights each time the veniremember moved, there was no way we could see each individual veniremember except for maybe on the first two rows; even then, we could only barely see their eyes.

The visiting judge started the voir dire and surprisingly made little mention of COVID-19 and the abnormal environment we were in. He gave a standard voir dire covering general principles of law applicable to a criminal case. The prosecutor likewise made little mention of COVID-19 and went through the standard State DWI voir dire (e.g. review the elements, discuss potential grounds for cause).

When it came time for me to start, I knew I had a tough road ahead. Ordinarily, I use a power point to talk about the burden of proof and other issues related to the issues in my case. I threw it all out. Again, I knew I had to shift the paradigm and had to prepare the veniremembers for what lied ahead.

The DWI was important but, like I told the jurors, there was a bigger elephant in the room, and it was a really big elephant given the size of the hall at NRG arena we were in. That elephant: COVID-19. I talked to the jurors about their opinions about the pandemic, setting it up as a scaled question where a “4” was a person who was hypervigilant and hardly ever left their home, while a “1” was a person who thought the virus was a hoax and was appalled about wearing masks. This gave us the opportunity to get an idea of who would be receptive to our position. And then we told them ours. I explained how I was somewhere between a 3 and 4, my brother-in-law being an epidemiologist and having lost friends to COVID-19; my associate was also between a 3 and 4 as her mom was immunocompromised having just beat breast cancer.

I then explained to them how things have been working in the criminal justice system since the COVID-19 pandemic began, how judges were panicked about the wheels of justice coming to a halt, and how they were pushing things to get moving again.

I then talked to them about Zoom and other videoconferencing apps to see how many of them were familiar with it and used it regularly. I then explained how we in the criminal justice system had been using it on a daily basis for day to day court appearances and to keep the “wheels turning.”

Then, I turned to our present dilemma. With the presiding judge not being there, it was easy for me to scapegoat her. I told the jurors that we had pleaded with her to push this off until after the pandemic settled and how we did not need to put ourselves or jurors at risk. I told them, as much as they did not want to be there, we wanted to be there even less. I felt this would make them less likely to punish us for their plight.

But then I explained that the judge had given us the option of appearing by Zoom. We told the panel that we wanted everyone to appear by Zoom – the prosecutors, the witnesses, and, most importantly, them. But logistically, it was not going to work so I then reached the climax of the voir dire: we could not pass up appearing by Zoom — that myself, my associate, and our client did not want to put our health and safety at risk being in the courtroom. At that point, we asked who would be offended by that and, as grounds for cause, who could not treat us impartially even though, while they would be in the courtroom, we would only be on television monitors.

By then, having had an open, honest discussion about COVID-19, the jurors were willing to open up. Several said they were indeed offended and would not treat us the same; those jurors would ultimately be struck for cause by the visiting judge. Fortunately, there was a good number of other veniremembers who gave us their commitment that they would hold the State to their burden and not treat us differently. At the end, we got six good jurors and one alternate. Before I concluded, I told them, it was going to be the last time we saw each other in person. It was a surreal moment.

“Uh, We Can’t See the Jury”

The following day, while we were expecting to not see them in person, we were not expecting to not see them at all. But that is exactly what happened.

Having spent the afternoon before, after voir dire talking with the prosecutors about exhibits (which we agreed to preadmit) and witnesses, things started off smoothly putting agreed motions in limine on the record and renewing my objections to the proceedings. But then, when I pointed out to the judge that we could not see the jury — and she responded by saying she was not putting a camera on the jury — we knew we were in for nothing short of a kangaroo court.

I was set up on my computer in my office without a mask. My associate was similarly situated in her office. Our client was set up on his laptop at his office. We would use text messaging to communicate with each other (which had its limits).

We had a camera view of the well of the court with counsel tables where we could see the prosecutors. The judge had arranged to have a laptop set up in front of the witness stand which allowed us to see the witness and the witness to see me during questioning. The judge’s camera was helpful, not for being able to see her, but because it allowed us to see one of the monitors in the courtroom set up behind and to the side of her bench.

This would be a critical component of this entire process because it allowed us to see what the jurors were seeing in the courtroom on the “Zoom screen.” Even though I would be set up with gallery view or have whoever was speaking “pinned” on my monitor so I could watch them, the judge controlled what was published on the monitor in the courtroom. Instead of having a gallery view (where each party on the Zoom is shown), it only showed whoever was speaking. Since that was almost always me, it was almost always my face on the screen. The only time the jurors saw our client was when he was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” and then, at the end of the trial when, at the beginning of my closing, I asked him to say “hello” so that his voice would switch the voice-activated camera to him and show him on the monitor. I wanted the jurors to see his face one last time to remind them that they held his fate in their hands. Otherwise, with his face not being shown, we did not have to worry about an expression, smirk, or laugh being heard or seen by the jury.

Of course, we were not going to have the same benefit. When I gave my opening statement, I was talking to a computer monitor that had my face on it. I could not see the jury. It was like practicing my opening in front of mirror except I could hear my voice through the computer speakers as well. I also had my notes in a separate window below the Zoom window on my computer monitor as if I had a teleprompter I could read off or look at to remind me what I wanted to say to the camera.

When the prosecutors called their first and only witness,24 surprisingly, he had a mask on. This was contrary to what the judge’s trial safety plan had provided. Nevertheless, we were able to watch him in a separate Zoom window. We turned off our cameras (except our client; the judge wanted to make sure he was watching) and muted our microphones so that I would not be shown on the monitor in the courtroom. This was beneficial because I could take notes, look up things in exhibits, exchange text messages, even do legal research on my second computer monitor without the jurors seeing me fidgeting around or even hearing what I was saying as I was talking with my associate in her office down the hall.

When it came time for cross-examination of the officer, I knew I was in for a different experience. Not being there, not being able to see the jury and read their reactions, and not being able to physically get up in his face put me at a distinct advantage. But the Zoom setup did something beneficial. Even though I was not physically in his face, the laptop was set up directly in front of the witness stand so I was “virtually” in his face for the entire cross. Whereas officers are typically trained to look at the jurors when responding, while this officer did it at first, after several questions, he was locked on my on the screen.

As for the jurors, although I could not see what they were doing, I could see what they were looking at on the monitor in the courtroom: me.

Every time I asked the officer a question, I could watch my demeanor, expressions, and delivery while also hearing my question through my computer speakers. This provided me with instant feedback and helped make me self-aware of what I was doing unlike any of the over 100 trials I had participated in prior to this.

As much as I hated not being able to see the jury, this atrocity was allowing me to focus on nothing else but what they were seeing.

Handling evidence also was much better. Instead of fumbling around with courtroom equipment or getting up to approach the witness stand, I simply had to hit the “Share Screen” button and, since I had all my exhibits set up in separate windows, I just selected what I needed to publish and then, boom, it was on that monitor in the courtroom for the jurors to see. I used Adobe Acrobat Pro to highlight items on exhibits that I needed to highlight. I could play a video on my computer, stop it, stop the screen share so that I was back on the monitor in the courtroom, and ask a question of the officer. Then, if I needed to jump back the video, a couple of clicks, and the jurors were back to watching the video on the monitor.

At the end of my cross, I had a satisfied feeling because I asked every question I wanted to ask and made every point that I wanted to make. But still, I had no way of knowing what the jury was thinking. I had no idea if they had understood what I was asking or where I was going. I had no idea if they were rolling their eyes or falling asleep.

It would be the same experience when I gave my closing argument. I had a couple PowerPoint slides that I opened with after opening with my client’s face being shown on the monitor. But then, it was just me, speaking to the jury but not seeing the jury.

After the jury went back to the jury room to begin deliberations, the judge stepped off the bench and it was just the prosecutors on Zoom. I asked them, “What were the jurors doing during the closing arguments?” Again, I had no idea how they responded.

While the jury deliberated, I started working on a motion to dismiss our petition for writ of mandamus to file in the court of appeals, leaving a blank where I stated what the jury’s decision was. Although I expected it would be summarily denied like all the others, I did not want to take the chance that it would create bad precedent.

Twenty minutes later, the jury came back with a verdict. Not Guilty.

It was vindication, not just for our client, but for everything we went through.

Afterthoughts about Trial by Zoom

Despite the outcome, everything we went through was an abomination. From not being able to exercise our conscience to comply with our ethical obligations, to the multiple violations of our client’s constitutional rights, to the mere fact that we were gathering in a public place when health officials were warning people in the community of a third spike in infections and more deaths made me ashamed of our entire system. Instead of working to seek justice in compliance with the law and respectful of the rights and safety of all involved, we were an unwilling participant in an authoritarian regime. A judicial body focused on one thing and one thing only: keeping the wheels of justices turning.

In my voir dire, I explained it this way. The judicial system is like a car. The judge is the driver. The parties are the two kids in the backseat fighting. The jurors are the unsuspecting group of people standing alongside the road who get pulled into the front passenger seat to listen and settle the fight. But the judge is driving the car. They have to follow the rules of the road, but they get to decide how fast or slow to go and when and where to go. However, when the COVID-19 pandemic struck, those were nails in the tires. While we pulled over to the side of the road to check it out, the judges decided to get back in the car and keep driving on the flattened tires. Why? Because they had to get where they needed to go. No one knows entirely where that was, but it did not matter. The wheels of justice had to keep turning. It did not matter if it was dangerous to others on the road. It did not matter if was dangerous to the passengers in the car. We are riding down a road with flattened tires.

Like we told the veniremembers, we begged the judge to pull over to the side of the road and wait for a tow truck to come tow us to a safe place where we can repair the tires and then get back on the road safely. The judge in our case, like many judges all over the state, however, said “No. We’re going to keep driving.”

This article is not meant to be interpreted as an endorsement of Zoom trials nor should it be. We, as attorneys, must continue to fight this effort to use Zoom on every level. All of the concerns set out by Jennifer Lapinski, Robert Hirschorn, and Lisa Blue in their article, “Zoom Trials: The Idea Exceeds the Technology” in the October Issue of Voice for the Defense were absolutely spot on and witnessed by us in our exercise in futility. We provide this account of our experience to help attorneys who, like us, find themselves with no other choice but to participate by Zoom. Hopefully, no one will ever have to go through what we went through. Hopefully, this pandemic will end and trials as we have always known them and experienced them will return to normal.

There is one positive takeaway from our experience, however. Using Zoom helped me be more self-aware of a lot of things that I normally do not get to see or experience in trial. For one, I got to see what I looked like giving opening and closing arguments. I was more aware of my facial expressions and seeing what the jury was seeing. A lot of people will practice their arguments in front of mirror. I would suggest you practice in front of a Zoom camera. Although hard to describe, it feels more effective when you can see yourself on a monitor as opposed to an identical size, mirror image.

With these things in mind, for anyone with an upcoming jury trial, I strongly recommend holding a mock trial by Zoom to help you prepare. I have done regular mock trials before and they are indeed helpful. But getting mock jurors together is a hassle and seeing them sitting there in person whether in a conference room or ball room at a hotel makes the process too “unreal.” Instead of trying to recreate the trial environment, use the Zoom environment to give you what it does best: instant feedback. Instead of looking at the jurors, you can focus on yourself, and when doing direct or cross examination, focus on the witness alone. Then, after the exercise, the jurors can provide you the feedback that you are looking for both on your case and your presentation of your case. You can also watch the recording of the Zoom session to see yourself and fix what you like and do not like.

Zoom undoubtedly has changed the way we practice law. There is a real benefit to being able to appear at non-trial court settings virtually instead of having to drive miles to a courthouse, find parking, go through metal detectors, and spending wasted time waiting to talk to a judge. We should embrace the technology for those aspects of our practice. But the jury trial is sacred. As Thomas Jefferson stated, “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”