Browse Category


Requiem for a Titan

Scrappy. What a perfect name for a lawyer!  And it was so fitting.  But it wasn’t a moniker that he “chose” as many of our brethren and sisters now do to enhance their marketability. Scrappy was ascribed to Clifton L. Holmes, before he ever drew his first breath.  His aunt, upon seeing how active he was in his mother Edith’s belly started calling him Scrappy, and the name just stuck.  I don’t imagine that the aunt realized how prescient she was when she bestowed that nickname upon him.

Scrappy was born in the Piney Woods of East Texas in Kilgore on February 17, 1939.  His dad, Clyde, worked for six or seven decades in the oilfields – over fifty of those years with the same company.  And Clyde bestowed in Scrappy a work ethic which he carried all his life.  Scrappy certainly never forgot where he came from.  I will always remember him talking about his roots.  He would occasionally tell me about his Cherokee lineage and how when his grandmother died, she had to be buried outside of the community cemetery fence because she was an Indian, labeled a heathen.  When he would stand in front of juries and talk about not judging someone until you walked a mile in their shoes, Scrappy would tell it with a twist – talking to them about his little Cherokee grandmother and then telling the jury how she would always tell him not to judge people until he had walked a mile in their moccasins.  Might sound a little corny at first blush, but I knew he was talking from his heart. So did the jurors, and they ate it up.

Scrappy managed to get out of Kilgore, out of the oil patch, and while supporting his own fledgling family, he worked his way through both college and eventually law school, graduating cum laude from George Washington University National Law Center in 1966.  He then came home to Texas and started what would become a legendary career.

And what a career it was!  He was named the Texas Outstanding Criminal Defense Lawyer in 1992 and 1996 by the Criminal Justice Section of The Texas Bar.  He was officially designated a “Texas Hero” by a proclamation issued by the Texas Secretary of State in 1992.  Perennially tabbed as a Super Lawyer.  He was named by Texas Lawyer as one of the “Top Five Go-To Lawyers in Texas” in 2002 and 2007.  He was enshrined by TCDLA in the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyer Hall of Fame in 2007.

Absolutely one of the best lawyers I have ever seen communicate with the jury, one might argue about his place in the pantheon of Texas criminal lawyers, but there is no doubt that he belongs there.  And Lord knows that the best in the nation come from The Lone Star State.    Best of his generation?  Best ever?  I don’t know.  But I am certain that Scrappy deserves to be mentioned among them.  I am reminded of what Bum Phillips once said when he was asked if Earl Campbell was in a class by himself, Phillips responded “I don’t know if he’s in a class by himself, but I know when that class gets together, it sure doesn’t take long to call the roll.”  The same is true of Scrappy. 

But Scrappy’s calling wasn’t only about representing his clients, and he certainly wasn’t self-absorbed in seeking to polish his own star.  Perhaps his greatest legacy stems from his love of his fellow criminal defense lawyers which was exemplified by his dedication and constant efforts to help each of us become everything that was possible in our collective and individual pursuits of justice.

He was one of the early founding fathers of TCDLA, first serving on the Board of Directors from 1978 through 1984, and then as President in 1984 and 1985.  I remember him telling stories about them occasionally literally passing the hat around at board meetings in the early days to pay the bills. He was driven to find ways to help educate and train other lawyers.  To that end, he helped found the Criminal Defense Lawyer Project.  He was also instrumental in establishing the Trial College in Huntsville where thousands of young criminal lawyers have learned how to better represent the citizen accused. 

Perhaps as a result of how his grandmother was treated throughout her life, and her tragic experiences, Scrappy was a champion of racial and gender equality.  He loathed racism, misogyny, and bigotry.  Just ask Betty Blackwell, TCDLA’s first female president, how instrumental Scrappy was in encouraging her and helping her as she blazed a trail for our sisters in TCDLA.  Indeed, Scrappy was always at the forefront pushing us to become more inclusive and more diverse, to become a tent where everyone was welcome and equally valued.

His love for TCDLA was without measure, and his dedication to us was unceasing.  I could not begin to quantify for you the hours, days, and years that he enthusiastically gave to better our band of brothers and sisters.  The personal investment that he made in all of us is staggering.  I know this to be true, we have been blessed with a plethora of great leaders, but I don’t believe that anyone has ever done more for us, or more to promote the common good than Scrappy.  He was a Titan. 

Although you would never hear Scrappy complain about his lot in life, he certainly had personal hardships.  While their four children were still young, Scrappy lost his wife, the love of his life, Edwina.  Additionally, in the late 70s, he was riding in a car with fellow lawyers that was involved in a terrible accident where one of them was killed.  Scrappy was thrown from the vehicle and onto the pavement, physically broken, causing him to endure multiple future surgeries and encumbering him with pain for the rest of his life.  Then, within the past decade, he lost a beloved grandson in another car accident.  Scrappy knew devastating personal loss, and I think those experiences made him more empathetic to the plight of others. 

And oh, how he loved his family.  Loving son, husband, and father.  Doting grandfather.  In a day and age when grandparents seem to crave being referred to by the grandkids by whatever catchy or chic name of the times is, Scrappy absolutely reveled in his grandchildren calling him by that old-school southern familial name, Big Daddy.  He did everything within his power to let them know they were cherished, he provided for their educations, he endeavored to expand their horizons, and he encouraged them to find happiness and to become the best they could be.

Scrappy was compassionate toward others.  He was kind.  He was giving.  If you spent a modicum of time with him, you felt that you had known each other forever.  It didn’t matter if you were an old friend, a judge, a prosecutor, or a first-year lawyer – after two minutes with Scrappy, you would feel like he really cared about you.  And the truth is, he did.

He always treated people with respect, regardless of their station in life.  He was always courteous to his opponents in the courtroom, a trait that regrettably we seem to find in fewer and fewer lawyers these days. Scrappy was always perplexed by the erosion of civility and hoped that we would find a way to return to that as a norm.

And what a mind! His intellect was absolutely astounding. In many ways that made his battle with the cruel disease of dementia seem particularly unfair – to see the brilliance stripped away. I know that we do not get to choose the manner of our departure from this world, and I recognize that death comes to us in a variety of ways. The manner of our passing is unrelated to our character, and good people often have to sometimes fight long and protracted battles. But, I just can’t help but feel that Scrappy deserved better. Instead of that brilliant mind slipping into a state where he didn’t know who or where he was, or what he had been, it would have been so much more fitting for him to die in a courtroom at the end of one of his great closing arguments. He should have been carried from a courtroom on his shield.  

He was such a joy to be around.  His wit, his warmth. . . he was always the hub of the wheel in any setting.  Folks were drawn to him, and vice-versa.  He loved people, and we loved him.  Scrappy meant so much to so many of us.

As a result of that, he will endure.  Thomas Campbell once wrote, “To live in the hearts we leave behind is not to die.”  That certainly is true of Scrappy.

C.H. Spradlin said it another way, “A good character is the best tombstone.  Those who love you, and were helped by you, will remember you. So, carve your name on hearts, and not on marble.” 

I will miss Scrappy immensely and all the good times we had together.  His name is certainly carved on my heart, as it is with many of you.

I think of To Kill a Mockingbird (just about everyone’s favorite lawyer book/movie), and the scene where Atticus Finch is preparing to leave the courtroom after Tom Robinson’s conviction.  Atticus has done his best for Tom and in doing so exposed the racism surrounding the accusation and the trial.  Still, Tom is found guilty.  Atticus’s daughter, Jean Louise, better known as Scout, is sitting in the courtroom’s balcony with the blacks from the community, who were segregated and excluded from the main floor of the courtroom.  As Atticus began to leave, all of the African Americans silently rose to their feet in a show of respect for him.  Scout, still seated, doesn’t seem to understand what was happening until Reverend Sykes tells her “Miss Jean Louise?  Miss Jean Louise, stand up.  Your father is passin’”.

TCDLA?  TCDLA, stand up.  Scrappy’s passin’.

ABCs and 123s of Parole Law: An Introduction to Parole Law

Welcome to the world of parole law. It is an honor to be asked to write about my practice area for the TCDLA membership. It is also a privilege to be selected to be a board member for this wonderful organization. I am passionate about my work and love my career.

For those of you who don’t know me, I spent the first 12 years of my career as a public defender in Chicago (Cook County). I started in Traffic Court and worked my way up to the Felony Trial Division. The pace was frantic and the caseloads immense; there was always ongoing litigation.

I moved to Texas in 2015 and started my law firm focusing on a statewide parole practice. In the upcoming months, I will write a series of articles on parole law. The purpose of these articles will be to give clear, concise, and easy-to-apply principles of parole law for practitioners to use daily. Some of the topics will include general parole fundamentals, the parole review process, discretionary mandatory supervision, and parole revocation hearings. 

For starters, parole law can be confusing. That is mostly because there is no central repository for parole law. Most of the “rules” pertaining to parole issues come from many different sources including: Chapter 508 of the Government Code, Texas Administrative Code, Parole Board Policies and Directives, Parole Division Parole Operating Procedures, and case law.

One of the biggest differences between parole law and criminal defense law is the focus of the work. In criminal defense work, we are generally micro-focused on the case at hand. We are looking at the offense charged, the elements of the offense, the evidence, and any potential defenses. Due to time constraints, we rarely have time to focus much on mitigation until after the case is tried. And as we all know, very few cases are tried to verdict. So, the focus is usually centered on the alleged offense, but the full backstory is usually not covered.

Parole law on the other hand is macro-focused. The instant offense is just one small part of the overall picture. In fact, during my daylong long interviews with my clients (many lasting over six hours), we may only discuss the instant offense for 30 minutes or so. We spend the rest of the time discussing their childhood, adolescence, education, family, home environment, mental health, learning disabilities, medical issues, ties to the community, family support, job skills, employment history, prior offenses, and conduct in prison, just to name a few. 

You could say that parole law is holistic in nature; it looks at the whole person and not just the instant offense. In the following article and the ones to follow, I will present the most common questions and topics clients and attorneys ask regarding corrections and parole. Parole can be quite complicated, but this article and the ones to follow should be a great start for attorneys when advising clients who may be facing prison sentences. 

Who Are the Parties Involved in Parole Decisions?

The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (“Parole Board”) determines who shall be released on parole. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) has no say in the release of offenders. Contrary to popular belief, the Parole Board and TDCJ are not the same entity. You can think of it this way: TDCJ houses and monitors offenders until and unless the Parole Board tells them otherwise. The Parole Board doesn’t tell TDCJ how to run their prisons, and TDCJ doesn’t tell the Parole Board whom to release.

The Parole Board is actually comprised of seven board offices: Amarillo, Angleton, Austin, Gatesville, Huntsville, Palestine, and San Antonio. Board Offices are assigned to vote on prison units in their general geographic region. For example, the Austin Board generally votes on cases in Central Texas and the San Antonio Board generally votes on cases in South Texas. Each board office has three voters (one Board Member and two Parole Commissioners).

What may be surprising is that votes are not done as a group. The first voter on a particular case (lead voter) typically votes on a case, and then the file is turned over to the next voter. Two of three votes are needed to either grant or deny parole.1 In a typical year, the Parole Board will vote on 80,000 cases. Last year the overall approval rate was 35 percent. There are many reasons for that number, but we will discuss that in the next article.

What Kinds of Votes Are There?

When an offender2 is reviewed for parole, it is not usually a “yes” or “no” vote. The Parole Board has many options when deciding to grant or deny parole. For parole approvals, the Board can order many types of votes, which are called FI votes. Among the more common votes: immediate release (FI-1 vote), substance abuse programs FI-5, FI-6, or FI-R vote), or sex offender programs (FI-4, FI-9, & FI-18 vote). In fact last year, of the offenders granted parole, approximately two-thirds of offenders were required to complete a program in prison prior to release.

Where Will Offender Go and How Soon Until They Leave?

Offenders generally stay in county jail no longer than 45 days after sentencing. This is referred to as “catching chain.” Offenders must first go to an intake unit. The intake units for men are the Byrd, Gurney, Holliday, and Garza West Units. Women generally go to the Plane State Jail and Woodman State Jail for intake.

What Happens at Intake Units?

Once an offender arrives at the intake unit, they are generally “off the radar” for three weeks. Be prepared to tell your clients that the first three weeks of prison are often the worst. Offenders are arriving at these units from all over the state. Some are there for two-year non-violent sentences and some are there serving life sentences for violent offenses. 

There are no visits allowed during this initial time, no phone calls, and no access to commissary. During this time, offenders will be photographed, fingerprinted, and assigned a TDCJ number. All tattoos will be documented and gang membership will be questioned. Offenders will also get medical screenings (physician, dentist, and psychologist). Usually an IQ test will be given, too. There will be little to no programming available. It is during this time that offenders are given their Line Class and Custody Classification. An offender’s parole eligibility date will be calculated as well. Within 48 hours of arriving at an intake unit, an offender will appear on the TDCJ website, which shows their unit of assignment and contact information.

Offenders can stay at an intake unit or state jail unit for the first two years of their sentence. This is generally frowned upon by offenders because these units generally have fewer options for work assignments, programs, and classes.

Good Time Credit and Custody Classification

Each offender is given a Line Class and Custody Classification. Line Class corresponds to Time Earning Status.3 For example, most offenders arrive at TDCJ as Line Class 1. With good behavior, they can be promoted to various Trustee Levels (SAT II-IV). If they misbehave, they will be reduced to Line Class 2 or 3.

Good Time Credit

Offenders entering TDCJ as a Line Class 1 will receive 20 days Good Time for each month served. Once assigned a job, offenders in Line Class 1 will receive and extra 15 days of Good Time on top of the 20 for each month in prison. If promoted to trustee, Good Time will increase up to a maximum of 45 days per month. Please note that Good Time is not awarded to offenders serving time for a 3G offense.4

Custody Classification

Each offender is also assigned a Custody Classification, which is also referred to as G Levels (G1-G5). This determines where an offender can live, how much supervision they will need, and what jobs they can be assigned. The factors used in determining Custody Classification are current and previous institutional behavior, current offense, and sentence length.

On the high end, G1 classification allows offenders the most freedom, and they are generally assigned to Trustee dorms with unarmed supervision. On the low end, G-5 custody classification is relegated to those offenders who are escape risks or have a history of assaultive behavior. Administrative (“Ad”) Segregation is actually the lowest custody classification. Those offenders are usually in single cells for 23 hours a day.

What About Credit for Time Spent in County Jail?

Offenders who are sentenced for non-3G offenses receive 20 days Good Time for each month in custody.5 Therefore, a client who spent one year in county jail before sentencing will receive eight months Good Time credit upon arriving at TDCJ.

What Kind of Job Will My Client Get?

Contrary to popular belief, TDCJ has many jobs and vocational classes for offenders to participate in. Everyone in TDCJ is assigned a job, everyone goes to work. For those offenders who are in ill-health or have severe medical problems, they can be declared “medially unassigned.” During intake, offenders should talk about their work experience, job skills, and certifications. Many offenders are assigned to field squad, laundry, or garment factory. In my experience, offenders who have marketable skills such as welders, electricians, and plumbers usually get the best assignments. For those who wish to learn new skills, TDCJ offers some unique training programs. I have had clients who trained security dogs used on manhunts and others who trained service dogs. I even had a client who obtained his CDL in prison and spent his time driving a truck back and forth between prison units. Once again, the availability of these jobs is dependent on the particular unit, their custody classification, and of course luck.

What Kind of Programs Are Available?

TDCJ offers a wide variety of programs for inmates. This is unit-specific, many units offer more programs than others. Many clients find that classes help them pass the time, learn something new, or just be there as a support system for other offenders. Some popular programs include: Quest for Authentic Manhood, Bridges to Life, Cognitive Intervention, and Voyager. Many of these programs are run in coordination with faith-based or community-based organizations. A few units offer college courses as well. Keep in mind that the most popular programs often have long waiting lists and entry is not guaranteed.

What Can I Do to Help My Client?

The single most important thing an attorney can do for a client who is going to prison is to SAVE THE CLIENT’S FILE. That means keeping the file, either paper form or scanned into your hard drive. This does not only include the discovery but also investigator reports, plea offers, and trial notes. I cannot stress enough how important that is. 

After being granted permission by the client, I always call the client’s prior attorney to discuss the case. You would be surprised how much information can be learned about the case from talking to the prior attorney.  For example, it is common for a deadly weapon finding to be removed in the plea process. However, if that deadly weapon finding were removed because the investigation revealed that no weapon actually existed, this can be a very helpful piece of information. Moreover, affirmative defenses raised at trial, even if not successful, can be mitigating factors when presenting cases to the Parole Board.

In the next article, I will discuss the parole process in more depth. Topics will include factors used in the parole voting process, Discretionary Mandatory Supervision, set-offs, ex post facto issues, and parole in absentia.

Absurd Results During COVID-19

During the pandemic, Texas resident Ace Cannon wanted liquid refreshments – beer, to be precise – but lacked the required monies to pay for his “need.” Undeterred, Mr. Cannon headed to the nearest Stop and Rob. Grabbing an ice-cold twelve pack of cans, Mr. Cannon quickly whisked past the checkout counter without stopping to make requisite payment. However, our “Hero” quickly fell into the hands of the local law enforcement, who arrested him for Theft of Aluminum, a state jail felony.1

The grand jury returned an indictment for that felony offense. The State then “enhanced” the SJF to a third degree offense because it was committed “in an area that was at the time of the offense subject to a declaration of a state of disaster made by the Governor.”2 Ace’s Class C theft,3 with an assist from the Great State of Texas, has Mr. Cannon facing a potential ten year pen trip.

I know what you are thinking. “They” can’t do that! Yes. Yes, “they” can.

If you have a client facing a COVID-19 “state of disaster” enhancement, all is not lost. Although the plain language of the applicable enhancement statute seemingly allows such “horse hockey,”4 a look back on the legislative history of this law shows otherwise. Time to dust off your knowledge of statutory construction and argue that the enhancement is ill-advised outside times of natural disasters – and offenses directly related to the occurrence of the natural disaster. In legal terms, to apply the enhancement for “an offense committed in a disaster area” in Mr. Cannon’s case would provide for “an absurd result.”

Not all disaster declarations are meant to trigger this enhancement.

The trip to the “absurd result” begins with the landfall of Hurricane Ike in Texas on September 13, 2008.5 Ike swept through Galveston Island and onto the Texas mainland.6 Pertinent to our Tale of Woe, police arrested eight persons in Galveston County for looting in the week following landfall.7 Over 100 arrests were made for “looting” in Harris County in the same time.8 Then State Senator (now Lieutenant Governor) Dan Patrick heard the siren’s call, and introduced legislation “to increase punishment in theft cases committed in certain evacuated or disaster areas.”9 It important to note that the initial bill was tied only to the Theft statute, but evolved into a general sentence enhancement. The chart below tracks the progression of all related bills through the Texas Legislature in 2009.

12/15/2008: Senate Bill 359 filed.10

S.J. of Tex., 254 81st Leg. R.S.

“Relating to punishment for the offense of theft committed in certain evacuated or disaster areas.”11

03/13/2009: HB 4101 is filed.12

03/27/2009: The Senate Research Center issues its “bill analysis.”

“This bill addresses punishment levels for the offense of theft committed in evacuated areas or disaster areas. After Hurricane Ike, local officials brought to light the problem of looting in abandoned or evacuated areas. Section 31.03(f) (relating to certain offenses committed by actors that qualify for the next higher category of offense) of the Penal Code lists several specific theft offenses for which penalties are increased to the next higher category of offense.

C.S.S.B. 359 adds Section 12.50 (Penalty If Offense Committed in Disaster Area or Evacuated Area) to Subchapter D (Exceptional Sentences), Chapter 12 (Punishments), Penal Code, to provide that the punishment for an offense is increased to the punishment prescribed for the next higher category of offense if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the offense was committed in an area that is considered to be a disaster by certain government officials.”13

03/30/2009: Senate Bill 359 is reported out of committee revised to punishment enhancement, instead of focusing on amending the theft statute.14

05/18/2009: The House Research Organization bill analysis is issued.

SB 359 would help deter potential criminal behavior during a hurricane or other disaster by increasing the punishment for certain crimes if they occurred within a declared disaster area. Curfews are not enough to deter burglary or theft after a hurricane, because many looters and burglars are discovered after set curfew times. Some residents do not evacuate during hurricanes out of fear that their homes or businesses will be broken into or looted. By enhancing criminal penalties for certain offenses, the bill would provide peace of mind to residents and business owners.15

05/18/2009: SB 359 is amended.

Amend SB 359 (house committee printing) in SECTION 1 of the bill as follows: (1) In proposed Section 12.50(a), Penal Code (page 1, line 12), strike “is” and substitute “was, at the time of the offense”. (2) In proposed Section 12.50(a)(1), Penal Code (page 1, line 13), strike “considered to be a disaster area by” and substitute “subject to a declaration of a state of disaster made by”.

(3) In proposed Section 12.50(a)(1)(B), Penal Code (page 1, line 18), immediately following the underlined semicolon, insert “or”. (4) Strike proposed Section 12.50(a)(1)(D), Penal Code (page 1, lines 22-23).16

06/19/2009: SB 359 was signed into law by Texas Governor Rick Perry.17

Currently, the statute provides for a listing of applicable offenses that can be enhanced under the statute.18 If a listed offense “is alleged to have been committed in an area subject to a state of disaster declaration made by the President of the United States, the Texas Governor or a presiding officer of a governing body under Texas Government Code section 418.108 or subject to an emergency evacuation order,” then the punishment is increased to that prescribed for the next higher category of offense.19

Here is where it gets legal

The legislative history shows a clear intent that the punishment enhancement was to be used in cases where there is a combination of a natural disaster and persons attempting to “profiteer” from the results. But the plain language of the statute provides no such limitation. So, in the words of The Stork, “what the hell are we supposed to do, ya moron?”20 Well, hold my beer. All that is necessary is to prove that jacking Ace into the Institutional Division is an “absurd result.”21

The start of this process is to use statutory construction. The objective of this process is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.22 To do so, the first step is to examine the statutory text according to its plain meaning.23 If the meaning of the statutory text would have been plain to the legislators who voted on it, courts are to “give effect to that plain meaning.”24 However, where application of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, the plain language method is not used.25 A statute is ambiguous when it “may be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.”26 Yeah, but how do you get to the absurd result? The absurd-results principle appears to be simple enough: “[i]interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results are to be avoided.”27 There you go. Just tell the judge to avoid this issue.

How about another approach, one that might not draw the blank stare of indignation or incite judicial anger? One a bit more “legal?” Texas opinions finding “absurd results” are divisible into four general categories:

  • The “conditional” statement, i.e., one stating that an interpretation producing absurd results should not be adopted if an alternative construction is available;
  • The “normative” statement, i.e., one stating that courts should, may, must, or will not adopt a construction of a statute that leads to absurd results, without making the exception conditional on the existence of a reasonable alternative construction and without expressly declaring that the rule will control even over the literal meaning of statutory language;
  • The “presumptive” statement, i.e., one stating that courts will presume the legislature did not intend for a statute to produce absurd results; and,
  • The “deviatory” statement, i.e., one expressly stating that the court will deviate from the literal meaning of statutory language if an adoption of such meaning would produce absurd results.28

Luckily, it is necessary to examine only the “deviatory statement,” as it provides the best fit under existing Court of Criminal Appeals guidance. The deviatory statement theory includes those opinions that state the absurd-results principle in terms that are (1) not conditioned on the existence of an alternative reasonable construction, and (2) expressly stated to control even over the literal or plain meaning of the statutory language.29 This category is the most significant for purposes of Mr. Cannon’s defense – because it is the only version of the absurd-results principle that is, on its face, a true exception to the plain-meaning rule.30

Two Court of Criminal Appeals opinions demonstrate the “deviatory” statement theory. Begin with Mr. O. A. Bizzelle, who in 1938, was convicted of operating a modern school of beauty culture “without having it at all times under the direct supervision of a registered hairdresser or cosmetologist.”31 Mr. Bizzelle had left his school under the care of another, one Miss Cavanaugh.32 Miss Cavanaugh had absented herself from the cosmetology school for “several days” while visiting her sister.33 Obviously, under the plain meaning test, Mr. Bizzelle has committed an offense. However, the Court was called upon to determine the meaning of the language “at all times under the direct supervision of a registered hairdresser or cosmetologist.”34

The Court quickly found that enforcing the plain language of the statute would “lead to consequences which the Legislature could not have contemplated.” “When the literal enforcement of a statute would lead to consequences which the Legislature could not have contemplated, the courts are bound to presume that such consequences were not intended and adopt a construction which will promote the purpose for which the legislation was passed.”35

A similar issue arose when the Court of Criminal Appeals was asked to determine the meaning of the statute which required “[i]f during the trial evidence of the defendant’s incompetency is brought to the attention of the court from any source, the court must conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether or not there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial.”36 In Johnson, while on the witness stand, the defendant “lapsed into a rambling narrative stating that he had been ‘under surveillance for five years’ by certain law enforcement officials; that certain documents and pieces of his private mail had been stolen from him… and also that there was a conspiracy among the trial officials, including the trial judge and his attorney, to send him to the penitentiary unjustly.37 Citing the plain language of the statute, the Court of Criminal Appeals found this outburst to be sufficient evidence to require the court to have a hearing concerning competency, and reversed the matter for a new trial.38

However, upon rehearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed itself.39 Apparently having realized the import of what they had held in the original decision,40 the Court quickly backtracked. “In construing a statute, its subject matter, reason and effect must be looked to… when a literal enforcement would lead to consequences which the Legislature could not have contemplated, the Courts are bound to presume that such consequences were not intended and adopt a construction which will promote the purpose for which the legislation was passed.”41 The Court then declared “the plain meaning” of the statute could not stand, concluding that “the Legislature could not have contemplated the consequences attendant upon a literal interpretation.”42

“Nothing is over until we decide it is!”

Let’s return to our statute in question. Clearly, Lieutenant Dan did NOT intend for the State of Texas to use this enhancement as a weapon of mass destruction – however broadly it was written. It was to be pinpointed to areas that were affected by a natural disaster such as a hurricane or other weather events – and at those who attempt to profiteer from said disaster. To do so otherwise would certainly seem as absurd as fining the owner of a cosmetology school for not having 24/7 supervision of the participants or having a defendant create a need for a competency hearing when it is clear that it is a fake. In other words, a link to the “disaster” and the allegations of the crime is necessary.

Further, when attempting to limit this enhancement to a proper application, the Legislative history comes into play.43 Extra-textual factors that maybe considered include (1) the object sought to be attained by the Legislature; (2) the circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) the legislative history; (4) the common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects; (5) the consequences of a particular construction; (6) the administrative construction of the statute; and (7) the title or caption, preamble, and any emergency provision.44

So what did Lieutenant Dan tell us in the legislative history? The bill was to “deter potential criminal behavior during a hurricane or other disaster by increasing the punishment for certain crimes if they occurred within a declared disaster area. By enhancing criminal penalties for certain offenses, the bill would provide peace of mind to residents and business owners.”45 It is also known that this bill arose at the time when South Texas had been hit by Hurricane Ike – and that reports of looting and other criminal activity arising from those profiteering from the misery of others had been published. Last, the bill’s title was “Penalty If Offense Committed in Disaster Area or Evacuated Area.”

The plain language may allow use of the enhancement in Ace’s case, but the adoption of such a broad meaning would produce absurd results – or [in less legal terminology] would constitute a “really futile and stupid gesture.”46 As such, Mr. Cannon’s indiscretion should not be seized upon to create another resident of the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Although the plain language of the statute provides the State with this potential, pointing out the irrationality of this application saves Ace an undeserved and unwarranted stay at TDCJ.47

Now, go do that voodoo that you do so well.48

Cross Examining the State’s Domestic Violence Experts: The Blind Lumpers

The Problem

A disturbing pattern is emerging. The blind lumpers are coming.

There is a growing pattern of the State designating and attempting to use advocates now in domestic violence (“DV”) cases to lump these cases into the same shape and size. They are frequently calling “blind” experts who either intentionally or unintentionally know nothing about the specific case – except for the fact the Defendant is guilty. Their job is to explain to the jury how every bit of evidence in the case (or lack of evidence) points to Defendant’s guilt.

For some time now, in child sex cases you can usually count on the State to parade one advocate after another to the witness stand to shore up the weak aspects of the State’s case under the guise of being an expert under rule 702. They often use their “training and experience” in their malleable discipline to show the jury they are human polygraph machines.

Now they’re doing it in domestic violence cases, too.

In DV cases these witnesses are armed with charts and anecdotal theories such as the Power and Control Wheel (“PCW”) and Cycle of Violence (“COV”). There are ways to combat this tactic by both effective cross examination and legal efforts to either prevent the witness from testifying and/or preserving the matter for appeal.

Overviews and Goals of the Article

DV analysis and interpretation is a soft science to be sure. It’s difficult to have any confidence in empirical sociological or scientific research done due to the inability to reliably have controlled studies in this field. The little research that has been done tends to be wildly inconsistent and point in all directions. Academic papers and researchers who attempt to harmonize these inconsistencies have a difficult time doing so. Other groups entering the ‘academic’ fray in the debate are also attacked as having a specific agenda.

Because the expertise in DV cases tend to be “clinical” in nature as compared to “academic,” the topic lends itself to being difficult to cross-examine. Practitioners in the field are coming to testify, and they are armed with mountains of anecdotal evidence and scientific principles they learned at weekend conferences from teachers whose name they forgot. Cross examining them can be like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.

What the State is really doing is manipulating Rule 702 to substitute advocates for experts, and thus far, the Courts have let them get away with it.

This article examines and discusses current trends and techniques utilized by prosecutors with regards to their expert witness practices. It is designed to assist the reader to effectively identify, cross examine, and preserve error when confronting the State’s DV experts.

“Blind” Experts

A blind expert is an expert brought in to testify who was not involved with the case. This person has typically not reviewed any discovery, conducted any independent interviews, nor generated any reports. These experts are often affiliated with third-party advocacy groups such as battered women’s shelters and/or children’s advocacy centers. It is not uncommon for these witnesses to be designated in every case by the state, and it’s further not uncommon for these witnesses to hop from one courtroom to another to testify in similar cases for your particular county’s DV prosecution team.

“Lumping” vs. “Splitting”

Charles Darwin originally coined the phrases “lumpers” and “splitters” which have gained more wide-acceptance over time. Healthy academic communities and disciplines have both. The lumper is the academic who tries to put everything in broad ‘lumps’ or big groups. The splitter is the academic who does the opposite. The splitter attempts to isolate cases and show smaller or more unique distinctions within groups. The lumper v. splitter debate can be applied to attempting to decode COVID-19, study dinosaurs, or the stock market.

The distinction helps to understand the State’s experts in DV cases are typically “lumpers.” That is, they lump everything into their broad world view frequently with little or no empirical data or support.

As always – when attacking an expert witness, it is fundamental to attack (often baseless) assumptions. Knowing you are dealing with a ‘lumper’ helps and gives you a base set of cross examination points.

Common Topics of State’s DV Experts

The Duluth Model

The Duluth Model is the most common batterer intervention program used in the United States as of 2006 and was developed as a way to reduce domestic violence against women. It was named after Duluth, Minnesota – the city where it was developed. The founder of the program was Ellen Pence, an activist. It is the framework of the BIPP (Battering Intervention and Prevention Program) course many courts require as a term and condition of community supervision.

Some staples of the model include the “Cycle of Violence” (“COV”) and the “Power and Control Wheel” (“PCW”) developed as teaching tools for the ‘re-education’ of offenders to address typically male violence towards women from a socially reinforced sense of entitlement.

The Cycle of Violence

The COV was developed by Lenore Walker in 1979. Her research was based on 120 battered women. Ms. Walker developed three phases in the cycle of violence:

  • Tension Building Phase – where the abuser becomes more temperamental and critical of the victim. As the tension escalates, the victim feels as if she is “walking on eggshells.” The victim often placates the abuser.
  • Acute Explosive Phase – Abuser verbally or physically attacks the victim.
  • Honeymoon Phase – The batterer expresses remorse and promises to change.

Criticism and weaknesses of “The Cycle of Violence”

It Presumes Guilt

The COV comes with a flawed and fatal assumption if it’s being used as a method to prove guilt. It assumes Defendant is Guilty in the first place. For any of the supporting phases to be true – this base assumption also has to be true.

If you replace the very top assumption with its opposite – Defendant is innocent – then absolutely none of the other phases make logical sense. But this diagram shows how the echo-chamber logic is circular in the first place.

The COV doesn’t Account for Mental Illness or Substance Abuse

A major gap in the COV is it does not account for mental illness or substance abuse. Ms. Walker’s original theory had “power” and “control” as the main motivators for domestic abuse, yet those who practice criminal defense on a regular basis understand the roles of depression, anxiety, and other mental illnesses on these cases. Another unaddressed issue by the COV is substance abuse whether or not related to mental illness.1

The COV Converts Evidence of Innocence into Evidence of Guilt

Another criticism of the COV is it takes evidence of innocence and flips it into evidence of guilt with rhetoric alone. Is buying flowers for your spouse evidence of innocence or evidence of guilt? Is having a calm marriage where something both intimate partners agree was not domestic abuse in the first place evidence of a healthy relationship or is it ignoring an two-ton elephant?

The State’s blind lumper expert would argue buying flowers is evidence of guilt because it shows Defendant is trying to control and manipulate the ‘victim’ in the ‘honeymoon’ phase of the cycle of violence. Then again, some spouses are just nice to one another and have a perfectly healthy union.

COV was Developed and Based on Anecdotal Evidence

Lenore Walker has conceded the data set of women originally studied was a small set and were all involved in violent relationships. She further admitted the women were not randomly selected and they cannot be considered a legitimate data base from which to make specific generalizations.2

“Duluth Model Treatment” Fails to Stop Domestic Violence

While academic studies are ‘all over the map’ on DV, there are many studies which show the Duluth Model – despite being the most common treatment method – has little or no positive effect on violent behavior. Researchers found in 2011 “there is no solid empirical evidence for either the effectiveness or relative superiority of any of the current group interventions… the more rigorous the methodology of evaluation studies, the less encouraging their findings.”3

The Duluth Model Focuses Only on Men

Yet another criticism of the Duluth Model is it is focused on male perpetrators and insists male DV is due to patriarchy which condones violence. Critics claim the model is overly-confrontational rather than therapeutic and fails to deal with underlying psychological causes.

A leading critic of the Duluth Model is Donald Dutton, Psychology Professor at the University of British Columbia. He claims, “The Duluth Model was developed by people who didn’t understand anything about therapy.”4 He also argues lesbian battering is more prevalent than heterosexual battery by a 2 to 1 ratio.5 Additionally, author Phillip W. Cook points out male-dominance is absent in homosexual relationships so the Duluth Model blaming male patriarchy falls flat.6

The Power and Control Wheel

The “Power and Control Wheel” (“PCW”) is a diagram displaying a pattern whereby a batterer establishes and maintains control over his partner. While the COV addresses phases in the relationship, the PCW is supposed to demonstrate methods and motivations employed by an abuser. It includes subcategories such as “Male Privilege,” “Coercion and Threats” and “Minimizing, Denying and Blaming.”

Criticism of the PCW

Like the COV, the PCW is similarly not validated scientifically. Further, it suffers from the same fatal assumption the COV does – that is, for it to work, the entire ‘wheel’ must begin with the assumption Defendant is guilty in the first place.

The PCW actually compounds assumptions, though. It primarily assumes defendant is guilty. But then it goes on to further assume the motivations for his guilt. It assumes motivations for being a “batterer” are rooted in power and control. Even if the person is guilty in the manner they suggest – the PCW has a major ‘blind spot’ because the motivation may have nothing at all to do with power and control. It could be mental illness, addiction, or reciprocal domestic violence.

Countervailing Theories to the Duluth Model

Reciprocal Intimate Partner Violence

Reciprocal Intimate Partner Violence (“RIPV”) is also referred to as mutual violence and/or symmetrical violence. It is where both partners – in essence – take turns being the abused and the abuser. The thought that both intimate partners engage in domestic violence undermines both the COV and PCW because both of those assume the domestic violence, abuse, and manipulation to be unilateral.

Several studies place RIPV at anywhere between 42% and as high as 70% of the over-case count for domestic abuse occurrences. In a 2007 study published in the American Journal of Public Health, researchers found about half of the relationships which experienced DV – had violence characterized as reciprocal. In reciprocally violent relationships, it was women who were the aggressors 70% of the time although men inflicted more serious injuries on their partners.7

Dealing with Medical Testimony – Choking

Evidence of choking can be difficult to detect and evidence will not be present in all cases. One law enforcement report showed in 62% of strangulation cases the police officers saw no visible signs of the choking. In 22% of cases minor visible injuries such as redness or scratch marks were reported. Only 16% of cases had significant visible injuries such as bruises, red marks or rope burns. Voice changes occur in 50% of victims. Chin abrasions can be common too as the victim lowers their chin to instinctively protect their neck.8

Visible injuries may be fingernail scrapes, scratches, or lesions.9 Redness known as erythema may or may not darken to become a bruise. Some bruises may not appear for hours or days afterwards. Much bruising is caused by an assailant’s hand or thumb and can make a discernable pattern.10

Petechiae are small red spots in the eye which are evidence of ruptured capillaries (the smallest blood vessels in the body). They can sometimes be found underneath the eyelid. Petechiae can also be found around the eyes in the peri-orbital region or anywhere on the face or neck.11

How the State’s Blind Lumper Will Testify About Choking

If there is little or no physical proof of choking – The State’s blind lumper will likely testify your client is still guilty. It is no different than a SANE nurse brought in to a sexual assault trial with their sole purpose to turn evidence of innocence (a clean medical exam) into an evidentiary tie. For example, the State’s expert will say, “just because there’s no evidence of choking doesn’t mean he’s innocent.”

If there is physical evidence of choking – then it’s probably time to get a medical expert of your own involved – typically in forensic pathology.

Preserving Error

Consider analyzing error in reverse. Be cognizant of the Appellate Court’s standards of review when making the appropriate objection.

Under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure the Court will either review an error as “Constitutional” or as “other error.”12 Constitutional error requires reversal “unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.”13 Non-Constitutional error or “other error” “…that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”14

Translation – if it’s not Constitutional error, then it basically gets ignored on appeal.

Making All Objections Constitutional Error

Consider ‘Federalizing’ your objections to the State’s blind lumper expert. Possible objections could include objections based on the confrontation clause or to the Due Process Clause under the 5th and/or 14th Amendment.

The Confrontation Clause

Under the 6th Amendment to the US Constitution, a person has a right to confront accusers. The theory of Rule 702 further goes such an expert would have to concede both good and bad facts or scientific or technical nuances which may hurt the proffering party. The expert is an advocate for the science – not a particular party.

But the blind lumper expert is designed so they can’t be cross examined at all.

They don’t know any of the facts – so you can’t undermine their opinion there. They also frequently don’t rely on any specific authority such as treaties, empirical studies, or trade guidelines they will admit to – nor bring with them to Court.

Because the blind lumper is not tethered to any specific fact, circumstance, or academic principle – they are very difficult to cross-examine.

Due Process

If you really think about it – all objections rooted in the Texas Rules of Evidence can be characterized as “Due Process” objections, too. Again, if you are overruled on objections to ‘bolstering’ or on a Rule 702 objection the Court of Appeals will analyze any error as “other error” which simply won’t result in reversal. If the objection is couched as a Due Process objection – and the Court agrees it is error – then you stand a real chance at reversal.

“Blind Experts” – a Texas Tradition

Rule 702 – And How it’s Increasingly Useless in Stopping the Blind Lumpers

Here is a quick refresher on Rule 702 and the rule’s application with regards to the blind lumper witness. There is a critical distinction between the State and Federal version of Rule 702 which makes the blind lumper witness far easier to proffer as a witness in Texas Courts:

Tex.R.Evid. 702:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Federal Rule 702:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. (Emphasis Added).

In Federal cases the witness must demonstrate a firm basis in the facts of the case. State Courts have some control measures similar to the federal rules – but they are supplied by case law, and they are far looser than the federal requirements. Texas Courts further break-down expert witnesses into different categories based on how subjective the discipline may be.

Challenges to the Experts’ Qualifications Generally Fail on Appeal

Courts have permitted the use of expert testimony on the COV and its dynamics of PCW to fortify a complaining witness’s delay, reluctance, and inconsistencies in reporting abuse as well as other behavior, including recanting a report of abuse.15 16 17 As recently as the week prior to this paper being written, the Dallas Court of Appeals again held a “blind expert” was permissible.

To make matters even more impossible on this line of attack for the Defense – the Dallas Court held because the “blind” expert was so general in nature, any error committed would be harmless anyway.18 The trial court even issued a limiting instruction because of how weak the testimony was. This holding allowing the testimony is illogical. To be relevant in the first place, the expert would need to be able to assist the jury with a fact of consequence in the first place. The Court by holding the evidence was so inconsequential conceded the expert was irrelevant.

Rule 702’s “Fit” Requirement

Some of the language which supports scrutiny towards the “blind lumper” expert witness is the “fit” requirement. Expert witness testimony must “fit” the facts of the specific case to be relevant under Tex.R.Evid. 702. Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d, 550, 552 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). “When examining the Rule 702 issue, the trial court must determine whether the expert “makes an effort to tie pertinent facts of the case to scientific principles which are the subject of his testimony.19

And then there is Bolstering

Bolstering is “any evidence the sole purpose of which is to convince the factfinder that a particular witness or source of evidence is worthy of credit, without substantially contributing ‘to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting former version of Tex.R.Evid. 401). Tex.R.Evid. 613(c) states, “Unless Rule 801(e)(1)(B) provides otherwise, a witness’s prior consistent statement is not admissible if offered solely to enhance the witness’s credibility.

Checklist for Cross-Examining the Blind Lumper

Start in Opening Statement

Attack the blind lumper expert in your opening statement if you know they are coming. Let the jury know what a blind lumper is, how they hop from courtroom to courtroom, and how the only thing they are sure of is Defendant is Guilty.

705 Hearing

Rule 705 allows you to have a hearing outside the presence of the jury examining the expert’s opinion and the underlying facts and data supporting the opinion. Always request a 705 hearing to learn beforehand what, if anything, the expert has reviewed prior to court – and when they reviewed it. Chances are if you argue about them being a blind lumper in opening statement, they make take a crash course on the facts of your case in the hallway waiting to testify.

i.Hit “Blindness”

If your expert is blind – cross examine them on it. If you’re calling your own experts, enhance your expert’s credibility by comparing and contrasting their preparation with your own expert’s preparation. Don’t simply let the ‘blind’ expert off with one or two questions about how they didn’t review the case – ask them as many questions on the ‘blindness’ as you can:

Q: You didn’t talk with the complaining witness?
Q: You don’t have any social background on the complaining witness?
Q: Didn’t talk with the detective?
Q: Didn’t read any offense reports?
Q: Didn’t look at any pictures?
Q: Watch any of the videos?
Q: Look at any academic studies for this case?
Q: Didn’t review any medical records?

Hit Assumptions and Weaknesses of COV and PCW

Discuss the weaknesses and assumptions listed above about both the COV and the PCW. Remember, they both presume guilt and not innocence. Further, if they are being discussed in punishment – remember they proscribe particular underlying motives which ignore mental illness, RIPV, and substance abuse.

Follow the Money Trail

If the State’s expert witness is from an advocacy center or perhaps hospital or other organization “supporting the cause” of ending domestic violence – explore the financial ties, if any, between that organization and the elected DA. Do they donate? Is the DA trying to curry favor with these groups or vice-versa? Is the battered-women’s shelter providing blind lumper experts something they all concocted in a board room when the DA was hoping to get a donation for re-election? Maybe there is nothing there – and maybe your blind lumper knows nothing about it. Then again, maybe there is something there a jury would find interesting.

Solving the Problem of the Blind Lumper

Blind lumper expert witnesses called by the State manipulate the rules and put Defendant in the difficult spot of cross-examining a Jell-O like witness who isn’t tethered to any facts, any data, or any empirical research. They twist, bend and ultimately ‘lump’ all of their opinions into “he’s guilty.” It’s a real challenge of your complete advocacy skills both in front of a jury, to the trial judge, and even the Court of Appeals to put a stop to their practice. Hopefully, this helps.

Expert Witnesses and Challenges to Expert Testimony Pt. 1

The admission of expert testimony is generally governed by one statute and four rules.  Discovery of expert witnesses prior to trial is governed by Article 39.14(b), C.C.P.  Texas Rule of Evidence 702 sets forth the standard that the proponent of the evidence must meet to have expert testimony admitted before the trier of fact. Texas Rule of Evidence 703 sets forth the kind of information that an expert may rely upon in giving opinion testimony. Texas Rule of Evidence 704 provides that an opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.  Texas Rule of Evidence 705 sets forth the rules that govern the testimony of an expert in trial.  Each of the foregoing is addressed herein. 

In part one of this two-part series, Article 39.14, C.C.P. and Texas Rule of Evidence 702 will be addressed. In part two of this series, Texas Rules of Evidence 703, 704, and 705 will be addressed.

I. Article 39.14(b), C.C.P.
Discovery Relating to Experts

(b)  On a party’s request made not later than the 30th day before the date that jury selection in the trial is scheduled to begin or, in a trial without a jury, the presentation of evidence is scheduled to begin, the party receiving the request shall disclose to the requesting party the name and address of each person the disclosing party may use at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, and 705, Texas Rules of Evidence.  Except as otherwise provided by this subsection, the disclosure must be made in writing in hard copy form or by electronic means not later than the 20th day before the date that jury selection in the trial is scheduled to begin or, in a trial without a jury, the presentation of evidence is scheduled to begin.  On motion of a party and on notice to the other parties, the court may order an earlier time at which one or more of the other parties must make the disclosure to the requesting party.

Discovery relating to experts in criminal trials is governed by Article 39.14(b), C.C.P. It is a unique statute because it is the only provision that requires the defense to provide discovery to the State in a criminal prosecution. Instead of using terms such as “State” or “defense,” the statute uses the terms “party’s request,” the “requesting party,” and the “disclosing party.” A distinction is not made as to whether the requesting or disclosing party is the State or the defense.

The process required by the statute begins when a party makes a request not later than the 30th day before the date the trial is scheduled to begin. While the statute does not say what the requesting party has to request, it provides that the party that receives the request “shall disclose to the requesting party the name and address of each person the disclosing party may use at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, and 705, Tex. R. Evid.” Rule 39.14(b), C.C.P. Article 39.14(b) requires only the disclosure of the names and addresses of persons that the party “may use” at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, and 705, Tex. R. Evid. In re Stormer, 2007 WL 1783853, *2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Pope v. State, 207 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized the distinction between a “consulting expert” and “testifying expert”, which is well established in civil law. Pope v. State, supra at 359-360. “Thus, once a party designates a particular person as an expert that he may use as a witness at trial, that person is no longer a “consulting” expert, he is a “testifying” expert, and the opposing party, whether the State or the defendant, may seek further information from or about him for use at trial.” Id. at 360. The best approach for defense counsel is to initially hire an expert as a “consulting” expert and then decide later whether the expert will testify. However, if the State makes the request for disclosure of the name and address of any expert the defense may use at trial, defense counsel must make the decision as to whether the expert is going to be a “testifying” expert, and if so, make the disclosure to the State, or he will not be allowed to testify over the State’s objection.

“In order to trigger the requirements of Article 39.14, a timely request that designates the items requested to be produced must be made to the State from the defendant.  Davy v. State, 525 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. App.– Amarillo 2017, pet. ref’d); Glover v. State, 496 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).  Absent such a request the State’s affirmative duty to disclose the evidence extends only to exculpatory information.”  Hinojosa v. State, 554 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Tex. App. –Waco 2018).  “Article 39.14(b) is not ‘self-executing.’ Tamez v. State, 205 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2006, no pet.); . . . . . .  Rather,  Article 39.14(b) ‘allows [a] trial court to [order] the State to list [its] expert witnesses upon a request,’ but, ‘[w]ithout such an order, [any] complaint [is] not . . . . preserved.’  Tamez v. State, 205 S.W.3d 39-40; . . . . . .”  Harris v. State, 287 S.W.3d 785, 792 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2009). In Harris, the trial court overruled a defense objection to an expert witness that was not listed on the State’s notice, expressly noting that Article 39.14(b) requires a court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion to disclose expert witnesses and that the trial court had not ruled on the appellant’s motion.  In particular, the appellant in Harris complained he had not been given the 20 day notice required by Article 39.14.  The court held that “the simple fact remains that, because he never obtained an order on his motion, appellant was not entitled to the State’s disclosure of expert witnesses not later than the 20th day before the trial began pursuant to article 39.14.”  Harris v. State, supra at 793.  Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in allowing the expert witness to testify.  Id.  The Harris case was tried several years prior to the passage of the current version of Article 39.14(b), which has since been amended to be more particular.

It is clear from the language of the statute that a party is not entitled to any discovery regarding experts unless the party has first made a request, and that request was made not later than the 30th day before the date the jury selection is scheduled to begin or the evidence is scheduled to begin in a trial without a jury. While the current statute only refers to requests and disclosures, the foregoing cases would indicate that the requesting party should also file a motion and get the trial court to order production of the name and address of potential expert witnesses by a date certain or risk a court finding that the party waived any complaint it may have about a party not providing the required information. See Kirksey v. State, 132 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2004).  Another reason to file a motion is because a court may order an earlier time at which the other party must make a disclosure to the requesting party.  Art. 39.14(b), C.C.P.

In Branum v. State, 535 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. App.–Ft. Worth 2017), the State added an expert witness to its witness disclosure less than 20 days before the trial began.  The defendant objected to the late designation before the witness testified, but the court overruled the objection and allowed the witness to testify.  In considering whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the expert to testify, the appellate court considered whether there was any showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor in the late designation and whether the defendant could reasonably have anticipated that the witness would testify although his name was not previously disclosed.  The court of appeals found there was no showing that the State failed to disclose the witness through bad faith, and instead found that the State notified the defense as soon as it found that the previously designated witness could not be present for trial, and identified its replacement witness. The court further found that the defendant could have reasonably anticipated that a representative from the medical examiner’s office would testify to the cause of death of the decedent. The court also noted that the defendant failed to request a continuance based on the late designation therefore rendering any error on the part of the trial court harmless.  Id. at 226-227. The court also found that the aforesaid factors caused them to conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the late designated expert to testify over the defense’s objection.

In White v. State, 2003 WL 865351 (Tex. App.–Ft. Worth), the appellant contended the trial court abused its discretion in permitting a State’s expert witness to testify because the State did not give timely notice of its intent to call her even though such notice was timely requested by defense counsel. The defendant had filed a request to the State seeking written notice of its intention to use evidence and statements. Unfortunately, the defendant failed to secure an order pursuant to the version of Article 39.14(b) that was in effect at the time. The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the witness to testify considering that there was not a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor in failing to disclose the witness’s name before trial, and that the defendant could reasonably have anticipated that the witness would testify even though his or her name was not included on the list, citing Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503, 514-515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

In Strawn v. State, 2003 WL 21235537 (Tex. App.–Ft. Worth), prior to trial, the State filed a motion to compel the designation of any expert that appellant might call at trial. The trial court granted the motion.  During the punishment phase of the trial, appellant sought to introduce expert testimony. The State objected to the proposed testimony because appellant had not disclosed that the expert would testify at trial. The court granted the State’s motion and excluded the testimony of the expert.  Noting that no Texas court had, at that time, published an opinion applying Article 39.14(b) to a defendant’s failure to timely disclose the identity of a testifying expert, and because Article 39.14(b) does not specify what sanctions are required or permitted should a party fail to comply with the trial court’s discovery order, the court looked at cases discussing sanctions permitted to remedy the State’s failure to timely disclose expert witnesses for guidance.  Id. at *2.  The court noted that appellate review usually encompassed two factors: (1) whether the party’s action in failing to timely disclose the expert witness constituted bad faith; and (2) whether the opposing party (the State in this case) could have reasonably anticipated that the undisclosed witness would testify, again citing Nobles v. State, supra.  The appellate court found there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that appellant’s failure to disclose the expert was in bad faith. However, the court found that the State was not on notice that the defendant intended to call the expert to testify, especially in light of the fact that a specific order was in place requiring pretrial disclosure of experts. Id. at *3. The court of appeals also noted that the expert testimony would not have been helpful to the jury in determining the appropriate sentence in that case and so held that under the specific facts of this case the defendant should not be permitted to avoid the requirements of an order entered pursuant to Article 39.14(b) by stating the expert is a rebuttal expert without demonstrating in some manner that the expert testimony was relevant to issues at sentencing. The court held that the trial court did not err in granting the State’s objections to the expert testimony. 

In Medrano v. State, 2008 WL 5050076 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), a death penalty case, the trial court ordered the State to provide the name, address and curriculum vitae of its intended expert witnesses to defense counsel no later than July 29, 2004. The State filed its notice of possible expert witnesses on July 27, 2005, which included the name and address of witness Alvarez. The State did not provide defense counsel with Alvarez’s curriculum vitae until August 19, 2005. The guilt phase of the trial had begun on August 15, 2005. On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, the trial court held a Rule 702 hearing outside the presence of the jury on the admissibility of the testimony of Alvarez.  Defense counsel objected at the hearing that the State did not timely provide the curriculum vitae and therefore was not in compliance with the trial court’s order to provide the information at least 30 days prior to trial. The prosecutor contended that he had given the defense copies of the curriculum vitae that he had, the week before. The State contended: “It may have been an oversight, your honor, but they were provided a copy of that.” Id. at *15.  Defense counsel argued he had been given the information about four days before, which did not give him the opportunity to investigate the particular individual. The prosecutor argued that the witness had testified in three prior trials in that county, two of those cases involving the same exact murder that was the subject of this trial. The State contended that transcripts of his testimony have been offered and have been available. Defense counsel argued that the court had ordered the State to provide the curriculum vitae to them 30 days prior to trial and the State did not comply. The witness had been on a list that was provided to the defense the previous week.  The court overruled defense counsel’s objection. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined the State only partially complied with the trial court’s order in a timely fashion by supplying only the expert’s name. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the defense did not contend the State acted in bad faith and there was not an indication in the record of bad faith. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that appellant could reasonably have anticipated Alvarez’s testimony, given that his name appeared on the State’s notice of possible witnesses three weeks prior to trial and he had previously testified in the trials of two co-conspirators. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Alvarez to testify. Medrano v. State, supra at *15.

In Osbourn v. State, 59 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.–Austin 2001), appellant complained of the trial court allowing an officer to testify under Rule 701, that a substance was marijuana. The witness was not listed as an expert witness by the State even though the State had been ordered to list its expert witnesses. When reviewing the State’s failure to list the witness, the court found that “appellate review usually encompasses two factors: (1) whether the State’s action constituted bad faith, and (2) whether the defendant could have reasonably anticipated that the undisclosed witness would testify.” Id. at 816. The court of appeals found nothing in the record that suggested the State had acted in bad faith or willfully failed to respond to the court’s Article 39.14(b) order, that the State did not consider the witness to be an expert, appellant had not shown the State intended to deceive her and did not claim the State’s action left an inadequate time to prepare.  The court of appeals found that the offense report clearly indicated that the witness’s personal knowledge of the discovered substance was rationally based on her subjective perception and that appellant could have anticipated the witness’ testimony, most of which was included in the offense report. The court of appeals also found: “If appellant was caught off guard, she did not request the trial court to grant a recess, postponement or continuance to remedy the situation . . . . . .  Having found no bad faith and that appellant could have reasonably anticipated [the witness’s] testimony, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion even if the witness’ testimony as to the marijuana was admissible only under Rule 702.”  Id. at 816.

The lessons from the foregoing cases are: (1) to file the request and a motion; (2) get a ruling on the motion; (3) scrupulously comply with the court’s orders; (4) make sure that the testimony of the expert is relevant to an issue in your case; (5) and do not be surprised when the court does not enforce its orders against the State; but (6) be prepared to make a record that the State’s failure to disclose was done in bad faith and that the defense couldn’t have reasonably anticipated the undisclosed witness would testify.

II. Texas Rule of Evidence 702
Testimony by Expert Witnesses

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

A. Predicate for Admission of Expert Testimony

While the admission of expert testimony is generally governed by Texas Rule of Evidence 702, it operates in conjunction with other evidentiary rules. “The Texas Rules of Evidence set out three separate conditions regarding admissibility of expert testimony. First, Rule 104(a) requires that ‘[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness. . . .be determined by the court . . . . . .’” Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Second, Rule 702 provides that if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Third, Rules 401 and 402 render testimony admissible only if it “tend[s] to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 401 and 402. “These rules require a trial judge to make three separate inquiries, which must all be met before admitting expert testimony:

(1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, training or education;
(2) the subject matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and
(3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the fact-finder in deciding the case.’

These conditions are commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance.”  Vela v. State, supra at 131; Harssema v. State, 2020 WL 831614, *12 (Tex. App.-Dallas, pet ref’d); Williams v. State, 606 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020); Brantley v. State, 2020 WL 1680050, *5-6, (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]); Murray v. State, 597 S.W,3d 964, 970-71 (Tex. App.-Austin 2020, pet. ref’d)Tex R. Evid. 702. Expert testimony must aid, but not supplant the jury’s decision. Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Macias v. State, 539 S.W.3d 410, 416 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d 2018). “Expert testimony does not assist the jury if it constitutes ‘a direct opinion on the truthfulness’ of a child complainant’s allegations.” Schutz v. State supra at 59; Macias v. State, supra at 416 (“The Court of Criminal Appeals has further held that an expert who testifies that a class of persons to which the victim belongs, such as child sexual abuse complainants, is truthful is ‘essentially telling the jury that they can believe the victim in the instant case as well,’ and this is not testimony that will assist the trier of fact.”).

B. Qualifications of Expert

In Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 527-528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated “that an appellate court should consider three criteria when determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in evaluating a witness’s qualifications as an expert: (1) ‘is the field of expertise complex?’; ‘how conclusive is the expert’s opinion?’; and (3) ‘how central is the area of expertise to the resolution of the loss?’.” The mere fact that a witness possesses knowledge and skill not possessed by people generally does not in and of itself mean that such expertise will assist the trier of fact regarding the issue before the court. A witness will not always qualify as an expert merely by virtue of a general background. Qualification is a two-step inquiry. First, a witness must have a sufficient background in a particular field, and second, a trial judge must then determine whether the background goes to the matter on which the witness is to give an opinion. Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex.1996); Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tex.1998) (“just as not every physician is qualified to testify as an expert in every medical malpractice case, not every mechanical engineer is qualified to testify as an expert in every products liability case”); Harssema v. State, 2020 WL 831614,*12 (Tex. App.-Dallas, pet ref’d). “An expert’s qualifications must be greater for more complex fields of expertise and for more conclusive and dispositive opinions.” Brantley v. State, 2020 WL 1680050, *6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]); Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Tex.  Crim. App. 2006). However, “[n]either a particular college degree nor a particular license is required under Rule 702 for a witness to qualify as a witness.” Cura-Cruz v. Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC,552 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, reh. en banc overruled).

In Broders, a medical malpractice case, the proponent of testimony from an emergency physician argued that merely because the witness was a medical doctor he was qualified to testify on all medical matters. Broders v. Heise, supra at 152. The Texas Supreme Court rejected that argument finding there was no validity to the notion that every licensed medical doctor should automatically be qualified to testify as an expert on every medical question. Id. The court held that “[i]f a medical degree carried automatic expert qualification in medical matters, a trial judge could no longer fulfill his gatekeeping duty and ‘ensur[e] that those who purport to be experts truly have expertise concerning the actual subject about which they are offering an opinion.” Id. at 152-153; Vela v. State, supra at 132. Instead, a proponent must establish that the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the specific issue before the court that would qualify the expert to give an opinion on the particular subject. Broders v. Heise, supra at 153; Vela v. State, supra at 132. “The focus, then, is on the ‘fit’ between the subject matter at issue and the expert’s familiarity therewith, and not on a comparison of the expert’s title or speciality with that of the defendant or a competing expert.” Broders v. Heise, supra at 153; Vela v. State, supra at 133. Thus, in order for an expert’s qualifications to “fit,” the expert’s background must be tailored to the specific area of expertise in which the expert desires to testify.  Vela v. State, supra at 133; Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Harssema v. State, supra at *12. The background that gives an expert special knowledge which qualifies him to testify and “give an expert opinion may be derived from specialized education, practical experience, a study of technical works, or a varying combination of these things.”  Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 337-338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (physicians with training in pediatric medicine and experience as treating physicians are qualified to testify about the nature and cause of a child’s head trauma).

While an expert must be qualified to testify regarding the specific area of expertise involved in the case, there is no “best-expert rule.” An expert does not have to be highly qualified to testify about a given issue. Differences in expertise bear chiefly on the weight to be assigned to the testimony by the trier of fact, not its admissibility. Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009) (internist who had knowledge of cardiac conditions and toxicology was qualified to give his opinion that a drug did not cause a pregnant patient’s cardiomyopathy; internist was not required to be board-certified in cardiology or toxicology to testify). The proper question in assessing a physician’s qualifications to submit an expert report “is not his area of practice, but his familiarity with the issues involved and the claim before the court.” Collini v. Pustejovsky, 280 S.W.3d 456, 464 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth 2009, no pet.). In ExxonMobil Corp. v. Pagayon, 467 S.W.3d 36, 52-53 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 536 S.W.3d 499 (Tex. 2017), the court held that a physician from one specialty may testify about the negligence of a physician from a different specialty as long as the standard of care for the task at issue is the same across specialties. There, a physician who did not specialize in emergency-room medicine was qualified to testify about negligence of an emergency-room physician in reading a chest x-ray. “A physician does not need to be a practitioner in the same specialty as the defendant to qualify as an expert. The proper inquiry in assessing a doctor’s qualifications to submit an expert report is not his area of expertise, but his familiarity with the issues involved in the claim before the court.” Estorque v. Schafer, 302 S.W.3d 19, 25-26 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth 2009, no pet.). In Burlington N.R. v. Harvey, 717 S.W.2d 371, 377-378 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), a trial court did not in err when it determined that an expert anesthesiologist had the skills and knowledge necessary to give expert testimony about urology. But see Harssema v. State, 2020 WL 831614, *12-13 (Tex. App.-Dallas, rehearing en banc ref’d, pet. ref’d), where the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of testimony from an anesthesiologist, who was the brother of the Defendant, about the Defendant’s neuro-degenerative disorder although the anesthesiologist’s training included diseases of the brain and brain function, he attended all of the Defendant’s medical appointments with a neurologist and had observed the Defendant on a daily basis as his caretaker, and the expert witness had researched the Defendant’s disorder. The court of appeals noted that the expert had testified on voir dire that he did not have the training and experience to discuss movement disorders in great detail and had not specified what his medical research or specialized entailed. Id., at *13.

C. Reliability and Relevance of Expert Testimony

Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), whereby it announced and implemented a process very similar to that promulgated by the Supreme Court in Daubert. The Kelly case involved the admissibility of DNA “genetic fingerprinting” evidence. In that decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly rejected the long-standing test of “general” scientific acceptance that had been promulgated in Frye v. United States, 293 F.1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In rejecting the Frye test, the Kelly court stated as follows: “[f]irst, there is no textual basis in [Criminal] Rule 702 for a special admissibility standard for novel scientific evidence.  Second, it should be fairly obvious, scientific evidence may be shown reliable even though not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” Kelly v. State, supra at 572. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the admissibility of novel scientific evidence was governed by Rules 702 and 403, Tex. R. Evid. However, to prevent the admission of “junk science,” the court adopted several procedural and substantive limitations. Under Kelly, a trial judge must first determine whether scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable and relevant so that it would help the jury in reaching an accurate result; and then must decide whether the probative value of the expert testimony is outweighed by one or more factors identified in Rule 403. Id. at 572.1

The Court of Criminal Appeals went on to address how the proponent of novel scientific evidence proves it to be reliable.

“As a matter of common sense, evidence derived from a scientific theory, to be considered reliable, must satisfy three criteria in any particular case: (a) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (b) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (c) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. . . . . . .  Under Rule 104(a) and (c) and Rule 702, all three criteria must be proven to the trial court, outside the presence of the jury, before the evidence may be admitted. Factors that could affect a trial court’s determination of reliability include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be ascertained; (2) the qualifications of the expert(s) testifying; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential  rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person(s) who applied the technique on the occasion in question.” 

Kelly v. State, supra at 573. The Court of Criminal Appeals went on to hold that due to the difficulty lay persons have in evaluating the reliability of scientific testimony, the burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence rather than simply preponderance of the evidence. “In other words, before novel scientific evidence may be admitted under Rule 702, the proponent must persuade the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence is reliable and therefore, relevant.” Id. at 573; Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 601-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Patterson v. State, 606 S.W.3d 3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2020) reh. and reh. en banc denied).

After the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Kelly, the Texas Supreme Court, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995), adopted the same type of analysis as is set out in Daubert and Kelly and has declared that the test in Kelly and in Robinson are functionally the same. In re M.P.A., 364 S.W.3d 277, 286 n.10 (Tex. 2012). The Court of Criminal Appeals has since extended the Daubert/Kelly/Robinson reliability analysis and criteria to all scientific evidence, not merely “novel” or experimental scientific theories. Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Reynolds v. State, 204 S.W.3d 386, 389-390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

After the Daubert, Kelly, and Robinson decisions, Texas courts had to consider whether those criteria applied to all expert testimony or was limited merely to scientific evidence. The question was addressed in Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The court held that “[t]he general principles announced in Kelly (and Daubert) apply, but the specific factors outlined in those cases may or may not apply depending upon the context. We do not attempt, here, to develop a rigid distinction between ‘hard’ science and ‘soft’ sciences or non-scientific testimony,” noting that “the distinction between the various types of testimony may often be blurred.” Nenno v. State, supra at 560-561. “When addressing fields of study aside from the hard sciences, such as social sciences or  fields that are based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to the scientific method, Kelly’s requirement of reliability applies but with less rigor than to the hard sciences. To speak of the validity of a ‘theory’ or ‘technique’ in these fields may be roughly accurate but somewhat misleading. The appropriate questions are: (1) whether the field of expertise is a legitimate one, (2) whether the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of that field, and (3) whether the expert’s testimony properly relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field. These questions are merely an appropriately tailored translation of the Kelly test to areas outside of hard science. And, hard science methods of validation, such as accessing the potential rate of error or subjecting a theory to peer review, may often be inappropriate for testing the reliability of fields of expertise outside of the hard sciences.” Nenno v. State, supra at 561; Taylor v. State, 555 S.W.3d 765, 778 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d 2019); Patterson v. State, 606 S.W.3d 3, 31, (Tex. App.-Corpus Christie-Edinburg 2020) (“Because a pathologist must interpret data and frequently cannot reach essential conclusions with mathematical precision, we hold that the admissibility standard from Nenno may apply to the expert testimony of a pathologist”, quoting Bess v. State, 2013 WL 827479, *26 (Tex. Crim. App.)).

D. Application of the Rules to Particular Cases

  1. Application of Nenno Standard

The Nenno standard is applicable to expert evidence in the “soft sciences” as well as non-scientific expertise.  Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“[e]xpert testimony does not have to be based upon science at all: by its terms, Rule 702, by applying to ‘technical or other specialized knowledge,’ permits even non-scientific testimony.” Police officers’ testimony on “grooming” behavior by people who sexually victimize children was admissible under Nenno as a subject matter within a legitimate field of expertise); Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony under Nenno about Satanism; expert “had conferred with other experts on the subject in various cases, and had spent years teaching the subject to college students and law-enforcement personnel,” was considered an expert by others, and had read numerous books and articles on the subject); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 765-767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (trial court properly analyzed and rejected expert testimony under Nenno standards because witness testified that research and the study of filicide–parents killing their children–was not extensive enough); Weatherred v. State, 975 S.W.2d 323, 323-324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification was determined under Nenno standards for “soft sciences”); Taylor v. State, 555 S.W.3d 765, 778 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d 2019) (psychology is considered a soft science); Rhomer v. State, 522 S.W.3d 13, 21-22 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2017) (police officer’s testimony on point of impact in vehicle collision was evaluated using Nenno factors because accident reconstruction was based on officer’s experience and training rather than scientific inquiry); In re J.R., 501 S.W.3d 738, 747-749 (Tex. App.–Waco 2016, pet. denied) (in case terminating parental rights, court applied Nenno factors and determined that psychologist’s testimony on parental psychological assessments were admissible); Washington v. State, 485 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (gang membership is legitimate field of expertise, police officer’s testimony that defendant was current or former gang member was in scope of that field, and testimony relied on self-admission and gang tattoos which are factors frequently relied on by law enforcement to identify gang members); Brewer v. State, 370 S.W.3d 471, 474 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (in aggravated-assault case, expert could testify about “psycho-violence” to assist jury in understanding a victim’s delay in calling police; trial court properly asked expert in voir dire whether her testimony would be “standard in the industry”); Hammal v. State, 352 S.W.3d 835, 841-843 (Tex. App.–Ft. Worth 2011) (police officer’s testimony on handling drug-detection dog was reliable under Nenno), rev’d  on other grounds, 390 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); State v. Smith, 335 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (proponent of expert testimony on dog-scent lineup did not show that expert’s opinion was reliable; expert’s testimony that his dogs were reliable and accurate in identifying scents, without any evidence to support those claims, was not sufficient to show reliability); Salazar  v. State, 127 S.W.3d 355, 359-360 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (upholding exclusion under Nenno of defense expert’s testimony on “content-based criteria analysis” to evaluate interviewing techniques used with sexually abused children; method was not generally accepted, study of technique was still ongoing, and potential for error was great); Roise v. State, 7 S.W.3d 225, 236-237 (Tex. App.–Austin 1999, pet. ref’d) (testimony of psychologist that photographs would promote sexual impulses and sexual fantasies and that children in photographs would have been developmentally harmed was not relevant or reliable under Nenno standards for “soft sciences”); Chavarria v. State, 307 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (the appropriate standard for assessing the reliability of a psychology expert’s testimony relating to his examination of a child sexual abuse victim is the Nenno soft-science standard, rather than the Kelly hard-science standard).

In In The Interest of K.L.R., 162 S.W.3d 291, 302-304 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2005, no pet.), the trial court erred in allowing a licensed counselor to testify because she did not state that counseling is a legitimate field; did not state that her testimony was within the scope of her field; and did not state that she relied on principles involved in her field. Id. In In re J.B., 93 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. App.–Waco 2002, pet. denied), DFPS offered the testimony of a psychologist who had conducted a parenting assessment of the mother whose rights they sought to terminate. The court of appeals, employing the factors set out in the E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995), found that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence because the proponent of the evidence had proffered only the psychologist’s testimony to establish the reliability of his methodology, but offered no specific, independent sources to support its reliability. In American West Airlines, Inc. v. Toupe, 935 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1996, no writ), the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony from the plaintiff’s treating mental health worker, as the expert’s testimony was subjective, the peer review of the expert’s method was limited, the expert offered no examples of publication of her work, and the potential rate of error for her diagnosis was unexplored. The Court held that these factors outweighed the evidence that the expert’s techniques were accepted as valid by the psychological community and that the techniques were generally used for therapy.

  1. Reliability of the Evidence

Even where it is determined that the expert testimony is relevant to an issue in the case, the proponent of the scientific evidence still must show by clear and convincing evidence it is reliable; that is, the scientific theories underlying the expert opinion are valid and the techniques used to apply the theories are valid. State v. Jordan, 950 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. App.–Ft. Worth 1997, pet. ref’d); Weatherred v. State, supra. Jordan was remanded back to the court of appeals from the Court of Criminal Appeals after it was determined that the testimony as to eyewitness reliability was relevant because it might be helpful to the jury. However, on the issue of reliability, the court of appeals found that the proponent of the evidence failed to present sufficient evidence of the validity of the scientific theories underlying the expert’s opinion or the validity of the techniques used to apply the theories. The Court criticized the proffer of the expert’s testimony as follows:

While Dr. Finn constantly referred to support for the validity of the theories in vague generalities such as “research of others,”  “some research,”  “a number of studies,” and even “one specific test”; he failed to mention by name any other person who purports to be an expert in the field or produce or name the studies he relied on to research his opinions. Dr. Finn also admitted he had never been subjected to peer review or conducted scientific research to test the validity of these theories himself. Finally, there is not evidence of error rate in applying Dr. Finn’s method of reaching his conclusions under the theories he discussed.  Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding his testimony.

State v. Jordan, 950 S.W.2d at 212. In Weatherred v. State, 515 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals found the proffer of expert testimony to be lacking, noting specifically that the defendant had offered the expert’s testimony but nothing more. Although the expert had claimed that he and others had carried out extensive research on the reliability of eyewitness identification and he had written much on the subject, he failed to produce or even name any of the studies, researchers, or writings, in question. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony.

When the alleged crime is a child sexual abuse offense expert witness testimony may be proffered to describe the “syndrome” experienced by victims of the offense. Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). From the prosecution’s standpoint, the purpose of offering this evidence is to assist the jury in concluding that the victim, who exhibits the described characteristics of the syndrome, was in fact the victim of a sex offense. Thus, it is the type of evidence that the offering party hopes to have considered as direct evidence of the charged act.  From the defense standpoint, the dangers inherent in syndrome evidence are not insignificant.  First, it appears to be establishing the “truth” of the allegation. Second, even if the syndrome evidence tends to explain that the victim has been the victim of a sex offense, it does not answer the question of identity of the perpetrator. To the extent that syndrome evidence is scientific theory it should be subjected to all the rigors encountered for any type of expert testimony.

Expert testimony on a topic may be admitted even though there is not universal agreement as to the validity of the expert’s opinion. In Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017), the State offered expert testimony from three separate witnesses regarding the cause of abusive head trauma to a child complainant. The State’s witnesses’ testimony was based upon a triad of symptoms – subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging and brain swelling – and through a process of differential diagnosis that was an “all – encompassing process – of – elimination consideration of every possible cause” based on the patient’s particular history and presentation. The State contended that the abusive head trauma diagnosis is widely accepted among esteemed national and international medical organizations as a valid diagnosis and has been the subject of extensive research. On the other hand, the defendant’s expert testified that there was significant disagreement within various segments of the medical and biomechanical communities regarding the validity of the diagnosis based on the triad of symptoms. The court held that the lack of universal agreement in the medical profession did not render the State’s evidence “junk science,” due to other indications of reliability from the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that “even accepting that appellant’s expert and the State’s experts were all qualified, their disagreement about their methods and conclusions would not necessarily render one side’s testimony unreliable.” Wolfe v. State, supra at 341. The court noted that just because two qualified experts may reach directly opposite conclusions using similar, if not the same, databases, or disagree over which data to use or the manner in which the data should be evaluated, does not necessarily mean that one opinion is per se unreliable. “That some scientists in a field disagree with an expert’s theories or conclusions does not render those theories or conclusions unreliable.” Id. That there is disagreement in a scientific community does not render testimony from either side of the disagreement unreliable, and therefore not admissible. Id.

  1. Credibility of the Child Witness

Probably the most significant case relating to the admission of expert testimony in child sexual abuse prosecutions (and, to a lesser degree, relating to the impeachment of credibility in child sexual abuse cases) is Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In Schutz, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the admissibility of five categories of evidence that touch on issues of credibility:

(1) substantive evidence of guilt which incidentally impacts on credibility; i.e., symptoms exhibited by child abuse victims and whether or not the complainant exhibited those symptoms; physical evidence and whether such evidence is consistent or inconsistent with the complainant’s allegations – admissible in case-in-chief or on cross- examination;

(2) general testimony relating to impaired witnesses or declarants; i.e., general testimony about the ability of a class of persons recognized by society as being impaired, such as young children or the mentally retarded, to distinguish reality from fantasy and to perceive, remember, and relate the kinds of events that are at issue in the given case – admissible in case-in-chief or on cross-examination if an impaired person is the victim or an expected witness (an impaired person could be a young child);

(3) general testimony that directly attacks credibility, i.e., testimony that the child has  general character for making untruthful or dishonest statements, or fantasizing, or is the kind of child who is susceptible to manipulation, or has difficulty distinguishing between fantasy and reality;  or testimony as to the common symptoms or traits of a child who is fantasizing or being manipulated, coupled with testimony that the victim does exhibit those symptoms or traits;  or testimony that the child suffers some mental or physical handicap, disorder, or impairment, coupled with testimony about the adverse effects that would have on perception and/or memory; or testimony that third parties committed acts designed to manipulate the child into making allegations – admissible in case-in-chief or on cross-examination to attack credibility of witness or declarant  (generally falls under Texas Rule of Evidence 608(a));

(4) general testimony that directly supports credibility; i.e., that the child has a general character for making truthful or honest statements; that the child does not have a general character for fantasizing; that the child is not the type who is susceptible to manipulation; that the child does not have difficulty distinguishing between fantasy and reality – admissible in rebuttal to attacks on credibility, so long as there is a loose fit between the rebuttal and the attacks on credibility;

(5) specific testimony attacking or supporting credibility; i.e., specific instances in which the child has lied, fantasized, been manipulated, told the truth, accurately perceived reality, or resisted manipulation;  child’s allegations relating to the offense were the result of manipulation or fantasy, or were lies, or testimony that they were not; child did not, in fact, accurately perceive or remember events due to physical or mental impairment- admissible only to rebut other specific testimony attacking or supporting credibility and only if there is a tight fit between the rebuttal testimony and the previous testimony supporting or attacking credibility. Id. at 75. (See Appendix to case – chart explaining admissibility of various kinds of testimony). Expert testimony is generally not permitted to rebut lay testimony. Id. at 72, 74.  

An example of the proper admission of expert testimony about the behavioral characteristics of abused children can be found in Perez v. State, 113 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. App.– Austin 2003, pet. ref’d). The appellate court recognized the long-standing Texas rule that expert testimony that a child exhibits behavioral characteristics that have been empirically shown to be common among children who have been abused is relevant and admissible under Rule 702. In a lengthy opinion, the Austin Court of Appeals discussed expert testimony and the “soft” sciences in terms of the Daubert test as interpreted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Nenno. The Perez court concluded that: (1) the expert’s field is a legitimate one; (2) due to the witness’s “superior knowledge and experience”, the common characteristics and dynamics of children who have suffered sexual abuse were within the scope of his expertise; and (3) the witness’s unimpeached testimony supports a conclusion that his opinions and writings on sexual abuse of children were accepted by the relevant scientific community of psychologists.

On the other hand, it is error for a trial court to allow an expert to testify, over objection, that the testimony of the child is “consistent with child abuse” or there was grooming in the case on trial. The expert may testify to what constitutes grooming or answer a hypothetical as to whether a certain type of conduct is grooming but may not opine that the child in question was groomed. Kelly v. State, 321 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)

Expert testimony about the truth or falsity of the allegations or the truthfulness of the complainant is prohibited. Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Lane v. State, 257 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d); Kelly v. State, supra at 602, (expert should not have been allowed to imply children were telling the truth by claiming she would not have agreed to be a witness in the case if she saw evidence of deception).

In Wilson v. State, 90 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2002, no pet.), over objection, an employee of the children’s advocacy center was allowed to provide expert testimony that 2%  to 8% of children who make outcries of sexual abuse make false reports and the majority of those arise in custody cases.  Id. at 393.  The court of appeals held that it was error to allow this testimony because it “did not aid, but supplanted, the jury in its decision on whether the child complainant’s testimony was credible.”  Id. at 393. However, upon considering all the evidence in the case the error was found to be harmless. For the next ten years, at least in Dallas County, the prosecution continued to offer, and the courts continued to admit, such evidence.

Then, in Wiseman v. State, 394 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2012), the successor to the expert witness in Wilson was allowed to testify, over objection, that only 2% of children who make allegations of sexual abuse are making false accusation, and that 77% of those are involved in custody or divorce-related issues. Citing Yount and its decision in Wilson, the court of appeals again found the trial court erred by admitting the testimony as to the percentage of children who lie about being sexually abused. Wiseman v. State, supra at 587. The court also rejected the State’s contention that the defendant opened the door to such testimony by eliciting testimony that some teenagers lie. The court reversed, finding that the expert testimony violated the defendant’s substantial rights because the case turned solely on the credibility of the witnesses and the testimony of the witness went directly to that issue. Id. at 588. The same result was reached regarding the same evidence in another case, Quan An Tran v. State, 2012 WL 1199102 (Tex. App.–Dallas). In Wiseman and Tran, the court of appeals found the testimony to be harmful, leading to the reversals.  The Dallas District Attorneys office quit offering this evidence after the decisions in Wiseman and Tran.

An expert’s testimony must be accurate. In In the Matter of M.P.A., 364 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. 2012), at a juvenile disposition hearing an expert testified that an Abel Assessment of the respondent juvenile showed he was a pedophile who had a significant interest children of both sexes. The expert testified that Abel testing was 85% accurate and had been validated by studies at Brigham Young University. The respondent was sentenced to 20 years.  On a writ application it was proved that this testimony was false. It was shown that according to Abel and his colleagues that the testing was only 65% accurate for classifying people with a significant interest in children under 14 years of age; and that the BYU studies failed to establish the Abel Assessment was reliable as applied to adults and it was unreliable as applied to adolescents. Id. at 286-287. The Texas Supreme Court found that if the trial court had heard accurate testimony the Abel Assessment would not have been admitted into evidence and that the false testimony contributed to the respondent’s sentence entitling him to a new disposition hearing.  Id. at 292.

In Kelly v. State, 321 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2010), the defendant was accused of engaging in organized criminal activity based on a predicate offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The court ruled that although the State’s expert witness could answer a hypothetical question as to whether showing the child complainant masturbation techniques with dolls was a type of “grooming,” the prosecutor could not testify and argue in his hypothetical by asking the expert whether she would expect to see grooming in a hypothetical case where children were forced to engage in sexual intercourse with another, and where multiple children were forced to strip down, dance naked, and act out in sexual plays and fantasies. The appellate court also held that the State was improperly allowed to ask its expert witness whether the child’s testimony was consistent with child abuse, and whether “there was grooming in this case,” because both questions ask the expert to give her opinion as to whether or not the testimony of the children was true.

Even when the expert’s testimony can only be viewed as an attempt to directly bolster the complainant’s credibility and as a direct comment on the complainant’s truthfulness, the abuse of discretion in admitting that evidence may not be reversible error. In Salinas v. State, 166 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. App.–Ft. Worth, 2005, pet. ref’d), the child complainant was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault examination four and a half months after her outcry statement to her mother. The examining doctor found no physical evidence of sexual assault. At trial the doctor was allowed to testify over objection that she diagnosed sexual abuse by digital penetration of the anus based solely upon the history provided by the child, and “she had an exam which was consistent with that history [no physical evidence of abuse].” Admitting that testimony was error but after reviewing the entire record, the appellate court concluded it did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict, that is, it was harmless.

  1. Admissibility of Testimony on Other Issues

In In re E.C.L., 278 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2009) it was reversible error to exclude expert testimony on “battered child syndrome” because lay people who have not experienced abuse for most of their lives do not have a frame of reference to understand why a child might have thought deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself and/or his brother.

In Reyes v. State, 274 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2008), an examining physician’s testimony was proper where she did not testify that the child was abused or was telling the truth, but did testify that, although not definitive, the child’s physical condition was consistent with the abuse that she described. Additionally, it was proper for the doctor to testify regarding the fact that child abuse victims also delay making an outcry and initially deny the abuse as the behavioral characteristics common among abused children is an appropriate area for the physician’s testimony.

In Bryant v. State, 340 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2010), the court found that opinion testimony of a police officer that he came to the conclusion a sexual assault had occurred and that was why he prepared an affidavit to obtain an arrest warrant was admissible in a child sexual assault prosecution. The officer testified about what he relied on to determine whether he should swear out an affidavit to obtain a warrant for the defendant’s arrest not whether the child witness was telling the truth.

In Zuniga v. State, 811 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1991), testimony of a physician, based on his own exam of a nine year old complainant, that history and physical examination was consistent with sexual assault, was permissible expert testimony as aiding the jury from a medical standpoint on the nature and extent of sexual assault, and did not impermissibly invade the province of the jury even though whether sexual assault had occurred was one of the ultimate issues at trial.

“Psychologists and counselors have been found to provide reliable, relevant testimony in child abuse cases, specifically regarding PTSD.”  Moreno v. State, 2020 WL 908024, *5 (Tex. App.–San Antonio), citing Johnson v. State, 432 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d); Zinger v. State, 899 S.W.2d 423, 432 (Tex. App.–Austin 1995, rev’d on other grounds, 932 SW2d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). However, in Lane v. State, 257 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d), the court of appeals disapproved testimony by a social worker that the victim suffered from PTSD due to sexual abuse. Courts have found that mental health professionals are in a unique position to explain victim behavior as it pertains to a disorder, such as PTSD, that is not commonly understood by lay persons.  Moreno v. State, supra; Zinger v. State, 899 S.W.2d at 432, citing Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), disapproved on other grounds by Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 

In Moreno v. State, supra, the State offered testimony from a licensed professional counselor with 14 years of experience with abused children, to testify on behaviors of sexually abused children, symptoms of PTSD, and her experience working with the complainant in that case.  The witness was, at the time of her testimony, the clinical director of a children’s advocacy center.  She testified that to be qualified to do her work she was required to have a master’s degree in psychology or counseling-related area plus 3,000 hours of supervised training.  She also testified that it was not her practice to diagnose clients with PTSD but that she could describe symptoms of the disorder in them. The trial court allowed her to testify as an expert if she did not comment on the complainant’s truthfulness. On appeal, the appellant challenged the witness’s ability to diagnose PTSD on the grounds that she was not qualified and that her testimony on PTSD would inappropriately bolster the complaint’s testimony. The trial court found the witness’ proffered testimony to be analogous to expert testimony on behaviors or symptoms consistent with child abuse.  The court of appeals concluded “that it was up to the jury to decide if the symptoms that [the witness] described really did help them understand the victim’s testimony and demeanor and whether these apparent symptoms actually reflected prior trauma caused by Moreno.” Moreno v. State, supra at *6. The court of appeals found that the trial court’s decision to admit the expert testimony on PTSD was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

In Brantley v. State, 2020 WL 1680050 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.]), a vehicular crimes police officer was found to be qualified to testify as an expert as to the basic functioning of a crash data recorder (CDR) and the data retrieved from it.  The court of appeals found that the witness’s field of expertise – downloading black box data – was not particularly complex. The court found that the vehicular crimes officer’s field of expertise in accident reconstruction was legitimate; that he testified within the scope of his expertise in accident reconstruction; and he properly relied on and utilized principles involved in the field of accident reconstruction. The court further found that the officer’s lack of knowledge of the manufacturing process of CDR and its accelerometer, or the black box’s rate of error, did not affect the reliability of his expert testimony.

In William v. State, 606 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2020), the State called an analyst with the Texas Department of Public Safety’s Telephone Records and Analysis Center (TRAC) as an expert to testify on the approximate location of a cell phone, based on historical phone records and a list of the coordinates of Houston’s cell phone towers, provided by carriers to law enforcement. The witness testified that she was trained in cell phone mapping, employed the techniques daily, and had three years of experience doing so. The court of appeals found that the plotting software’s error rate did not impact the reliability of her opinions; the cell phone records showed the exact tower to  which the phone connected; and the witness testified that she checked the records for accuracy. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the witness’s opinion on the general location of the defendant’s and the victim’s cell phones was reliable.

Some intermediate courts are giving great deference to trial court decisions regarding expert witnesses. Malone v. State, 163 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App.–Texarkana, 2005, pet. ref’d) (social worker with undergraduate degree permitted to testify to incest offender profiles based on articles she reviewed on the internet); Longoria v. State, 148 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist] 2004, pet. ref’d) (victim–impact testimony from expert witnesses about the physical and psychological impact of child sexual abuse was admissible at guilt-innocence because of its tendency to make more or less probable whether the defendant committed sexual assault on his two stepdaughters).

Other courts of appeal seem to be holding trial courts to a higher standard. In Kelly v. State, supra at 601, the trial court erred by allowing a DFPS worker, with an associate’s degree and without medical training, to testify to the sexual development and response of children as a predicate to her testimony about grooming. The lack of consistency in the appellate courts sometimes creates a guessing game for defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges as to who may be qualified as an expert and what “scientific” evidence  may be found to be relevant and reliable.

Report from the Reapportionment/Redistricting Committee

Friends, as you may know, TCDLA has a Reapportionment/Redistricting Committee chaired by Carmen Roe and myself. President Kerri Donica created the Committee and her successor Grant M. Scheiner kept it in business. We have been working and want to report our progress to the full membership.

Our mission was to determine if, after 50 years, TCDLA districts could benefit from rearranging. Of course, the first thing we did was to consult the bylaws. As it turns out, there is no mention of districts. In fact, they aren’t even called “districts”; they are “membership areas” (MA). See Article III, Sec. 11.  So, while we tend to refer to “districts,” formally there is no such thing.

As we thought through how to proceed, we came to the realization that TCDLA was NOT set up like a House of Representatives or like a Senate. Instead, it originated as a hybrid of both and for good reason. Texas is so vast with large areas sparsely populated, and at the same time, some population centers hold large concentrations of lawyers. Thus, a true House or a true Senate just would not make sense.  We concluded that the House of Representatives model worked well east of and in the neighborhood of I-35, while a Senate model worked well in the more rural and spread out parts of the state.  For that reason, trying to equal the number of TCDLA members in each MA was deemed impractical. 

From the beginning, we had the feeling that some members thought their county was assigned to the wrong MA in 1971 and that they would prefer to be moved. Even if “wrong” is not the correct characterization, have circumstances changed with the passage of almost 50 years was the question we asked ourselves.  The Abilene area and the Valley were our initial focus. We decided to test the Abilene area first. We did an informal survey and followed it up with a formal one. With Melissa’s help, we asked the TCDLA members in Taylor, Fisher, and Nolan counties if they would prefer to be in MA 2 – San Angelo/Midland/Odessa rather than MA 4 – Denton (where they are currently assigned). The answer was 94 percent yes to move to MA 2.  An important aside is that those members have nothing against the fine folks in the Denton area. They just never appear in court there, are far away, and do not know the lawyers there well,  while they are constantly in court in San Angelo/Midland/Odessa. The respondents also felt more attached to West Texas.

So, what is the goal, and what is best to do? We recommended moving those three counties.  Our hope was that members will feel they know their local representatives better, that they will be happier, and that membership in, and satisfaction with, TCDLA will increase as a result. We were of the opinion that a bylaws change is not necessary. We consulted Adam Kobs, Bylaws Chair, who agreed. No counties are listed by name in the bylaws as being in a particular MA. Perhaps a Charter Member can remember how the 254 counties were assigned to the MA’s. Most likely, a few of them sat at a table, pulled out a map and a magic marker, and just drew lines. This is step one, for we have not yet tackled the Valley or other areas of the state. We ask you for suggestions if you see a possible change for the better in your MA.

Based on the above, the Reapportionment/Redistricting Committee made a motion to the Board as follows: that Taylor, Fisher, and Nolan counties be reassigned to Membership Area 2 known in the bylaws as Permian Basin. The board approved the move on 26 Sept. 2020.   This rearrangement should have no adverse impact on MA4/Denton. MA 4 has hundreds more TCDLA members than MA 2, and only about 70 members are “on the move.”

We on the Committee appreciate the help we received from TCDLA staff and the confidence the board placed in us. The Valley is our likely next focus, so more to follow!  As we mentioned earlier, if you feel other similar changes can improve the way we deliver services to you, please contact any member of our committee. In addition to Carmen and myself, the members are: David Hardaway, Donald L. Wilson, and Adam Kobs.

Blue Matters Matter

By now, we all should know that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 39.14 requires the prosecutor to disclose to the defense the criminal histories of its witnesses. This disclosure often matters to defense counsel if the alleged victim is a “no-good SOB” who might have had coming what our client allegedly gave. However, what about those police officers that the prosecutor will parade into the courtroom wearing “just-so” pressed uniforms, pistols, and shiny badges? These officers would not have criminal histories, would they? Are there no skeletons in their closets? If they did, then they would not have those “Batman” utility belts, precise creased polyester pants, fresh “high-and-tight” haircuts, nor take on “Napoleonic” temperaments, now would they?

Well, that police officer might not have a criminal history (because he would never think of driving drunk), but if he has been a cop for any appreciable amount of time, you could bet that house your ex-wife lives in that he has been “in the barrel” with internal affairs or has received the Garrity Warning 1 2at least once in his career. Many criminal defense attorneys who represent police officers find that cops get into trouble about as often as other clients. They just get into a different kind of trouble. At trial, their trouble is potentially as useful to the defendant as impeachment evidence as are the prior convictions of the prosecutor’s testifying “snitch.”

A Brief History of Police Union Lobbying

In the mid-70s, a group of police officers bolted from the Texas Municipal Police Association (“TMPA”) to form the Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas (whose acronym is “CLEAT”).  CLEAT members believed that the TMPA was not aggressive enough in protecting cops from “management,” i.e., government and civilian oversight. CLEAT membership was concerned with matters regarding the discipline of law enforcement officers.

CLEAT soon got busy lobbying, and in 1987, Chapter 143 of the Texas Local Government Code as it exists became the law in Texas. Chapter 143 is essentially “legislated unionization” for municipal police and fire departments in municipalities where the electorate has voted to enact it. Those municipalities that enact it are called 143 Civil Service Municipalities (“143 Municipalities”) in the context of police and fire departments. Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, San Antonio, Austin, Beaumont, Port Arthur, Orange, El Paso, Lubbock, Amarillo, and Tyler are 143 Municipalities. Chapter 143 can apply to any municipality with a population of 10,000 or more, which votes to enact it for their departments.

CLEAT still lobbies and negotiates generous collective bargaining agreements for its membership. CLEAT takes pride in being much more radical and aggressive than TMPA.3

Discipline That Is Not Discipline4

What, you may ask, does Chapter 143 do, exactly? It imposes rules and regulations upon the operation, maintenance, and management of a municipality’s police and fire departments, including classification and appointment (Subchapter B), compensation (Subchapter C), disciplinary actions (Subchapter D), leaves (Subchapter E), and several other administrative “odds and ends.”

Included in “odds and ends,” found in Subchapter F, is §143.089, which governs the maintenance of personnel files. Section 143.089(a) states that officer personnel files are subject to public disclosure. It describes what a personnel file must contain, including any record of the past discipline of an officer. Section 143.089(g) provides for a separate personnel file that a department chief may maintain, which, according to the statute, is not subject to disclosure to the public. This file is euphemistically called the “G-file.” The contents of a G-file must include, inter alia, any records of verbal and written reprimands, i.e., discipline for policy violations.

So, let us consider Subchapter D and see how it defines discipline. Section 143.051 begins by defining discipline within the context of “[r]emoval or [s]uspension.” Section 143.052 describes the manner and method by which a department head (chief of police) may suspend without pay (including an indefinite suspension, which is the same as a termination) an officer for disciplinary reasons. Section 143.054 describes the manner and method by which a department head may demote, for disciplinary purposes, an officer. Note a similarity here? Hint: each involves a financial penalty to the officer in question.

Underlying the legal bases for a suspension without pay or a demotion assumes that the officer in question has been found culpable for transgressing one of the 12 enumerated “no-noes’” in §143.051. Section 143.051 includes such things as convictions for felonies and misdemeanors, incompetency, neglect of duty, discourtesy to the public (seriously!), acts showing a lack of good moral character (we’re not making that one up), off-duty intoxication, neglecting to pay one’s debts, being AWOL, shirking duty and cowardice. The “term of art” in most departments is a finding of “Sustained” for an alleged violation found to be “True.” It is possible, legally, theoretically, and practically speaking, for the charge against an officer of §143.051 to be Sustained without that finding leading to a suspension without pay or a demotion. Because of the progressive (not liberal but incremental) disciplinary policies that most police departments use, it is likely that an officer’s first time “in the barrel” for a Sustained violation will result in some disciplinary action that falls short of a suspension without pay or a demotion. By operation of §143.089, the paper trail that leads from an allegation of an officer’s violation of some part of §143.051, and to a finding of “Sustained” that does not involve a suspension without pay or a demotion will be nowhere in the officer’s personnel file maintained under §143.089(a), which is subject to public disclosure. Instead, these little gems end up in the officer’s G-file, and out of sight from the meddlesome public eye.

Put succinctly, how discipline is treated by Subchapter D is that it excludes disciplinary actions that do not involve an adverse financial impact on a police officer. An officer can be found to have violated a policy, rule, or statute that does not qualify as a discipline under Subchapter D of Chapter 143 because the action does not result in the officer losing pay, an unpaid suspension, or a demotion. Furthermore, records for these incidents are kept from the public by operation of the language of a statute that the legislature enacted because of the lobbying efforts of CLEAT. The upshot is that the form of discipline, whether written or oral reprimand, for a Sustained rule/policy/statutory violation does not count unless a portion of the officer’s pay leaves the public fisc by way of forfeiture of pay or demotion.

Case Law on Our Side

There should be no question but that these records ought to be available to the defense in a Motion for Discovery or by the invocation of the Michael Morton Act. However, prosecutors and attorneys representing Civil Service municipalities routinely get up in arms when a defense attorney files a Motion for Discovery or a Morton Demand seeking these records. Cops and their chiefs are very jealous of the contents of their G-files, and to some degree are so are municipal civil service directors. Thus, even a request for an in-camera inspection of the G-file is met with the rending of clothes and gnashing of teeth along with the filing of a fierce Motion to Quash.

But guess what? Besides Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), there actually exists state case law that supports at least an in-camera review of G-files in criminal cases. Back in the ’70s and ’80s, when Scooby Doo was still a common staple of Saturday morning TV programming, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.12 contained §27, which protected from disclosure any and all records maintained by the Texas Department of Corrections on inmates subject to “parole, release to mandatory supervision, or executive clemency.” In Texas Department of Corrections v. Dalehite, 623 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue of whether those records covered by §27 were discoverable by the defense in a criminal proceeding. It turns out that they were. Citing Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles v. Miller, 590 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979), the Court reasoned that, while some confidentiality was necessary in order for the Board of Pardons and Paroles to function effectively, the statutory privilege of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.12 §27 had to give way where it stood in the way of the exercise of a constitutional right. 623 S.W.2d at 432. The Court went on to cite United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that: “The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.” Thus, did the Supreme Court, as put by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, conclude: “that the President’s broad interest in confidentiality would not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases, especially since the production of the materials was for in camera [sic] inspection with all the protection that a district court would be obliged to provide. The assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” 623 S.W.2d at 423. Who knew that “Tricky Dick” would be useful to the Texas criminal defense bar in the Year of our Lord 2020?

Defense Lawyers Need to Seek the G-File

The writers suggest that where police officers have been listed as witnesses in a criminal trial, which is practically in every trial, that a Morton Demand, a Motion for Discovery of State Witnesses Personnel Files and/or a Subpoena Duces Tecum seeking the G-File should be considered by counsel. The G-File will probably contain information beneficial to defense counsel in trial preparation and cross-examination. The attitude of virtually all Judges is probably that the G-File is exempt from disclosure. However, if the criminal defense bar moves forward in this area to educate the Judges of the relevance of this material, that they should assume their duties to provide a fair trial under the law and the Constitution, then we may see the dam break and at least have the files more often reviewed in camera. If so, then we could expect that the salutary effect would be that officers would be more careful in their actions, the public might become more trusting of the system when bad officers are exposed. The benefit gained by exposing bad officers who shuttle around to various police departments might be realized.

Legislature Needs to Act

The national social conversation and political movements are likely to result in some remedial legislation. Considering the recent events in our country that highlight the need for police reform and more oversight of how law enforcement conducts and polices itself, it is time that the veil of secrecy that shrouds the contents of G-files to be reviewed in Austin by the legislature. Amending §143.089 mandating that any record in a G-file that could impeach a testifying police officer in a criminal trial be turned over to defense counsel is a step in the right direction.

So, it seems, that blue matters really do matter!

Motion and Brief for Discovery of State’s Witnesses’ Personnel Files

Veterans and Violence Part 2: Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological Evaluations of Veterans with PTSD and TBI

Legal applications and implications

Part I of this article was run in the October 2020 issue. Part II of this article focuses on the application of forensic psychological and neuropsychological evaluation to veterans with PTSD and TBI. 

Forensic neuropsychology is defined as the application of neuropsychological assessment and the examination of brain behavior relationships to criminal or civil litigants. Forensic neuropsychologist experts provide reliable valid assessment and data about the relationship between neurocognitive dysfunction and neuropathology and the behavioral and/or cognitive issues related to legal questions in court proceedings.  

Neuropsychological assessment is very sensitive to brain function and dysfunction and can be helpful in determining forensic/legal issues. Similarly, the forensic psychologist examines psychological and psychiatric functioning of an individual and applies this clinical assessment to forensic and legal issues. The forensic neuropsychologist who also practices as a forensic psychologist will often integrate a nexus between psychological and neuropsychological brain function/dysfunction, psychiatric diagnosis, and specific symptoms to the violent act.

In addition to the forensic neuropsychological assessment of veterans to examine brain function and dysfunction, the forensic neuropsychologist will often assist in integrating their brain behavior data with neuroimaging. Structural and function neuroimaging is useful in further assessing the specific locations of the brain that may be low in volume and density. In these cases, the PTSD and TBI conditions and their effects on an individual’s neuropathology are often cited in the limbic system and amygdala and hippocampus as well as the prefrontal cortex. Ideally, the neuropsychological assessment will be correlated with the neuroimaging findings (executive functioning deficits in the prefrontal cortex and attention, memory, and behavioral dysregulation, attention, and paranoia in the limbic system). 

The forensic neuropsychological assessment in veterans in criminal cases may include the following legal referral questions:

  1. Competency to stand trial
  2. Not guilty by reason of insanity
  3. Diminished capacity
  4. Voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity
  5. Self-defense
  6. Mitigation for plea negotiation and/or sentencing
  7. Issues relating to future dangerousness, lack thereof, and violence and sexual violence risk assessment and risk management

I will address some of these forensic legal issues concerning veterans, PTSD, and TBI below. 

The forensic neuropsychological assessment of veterans may ultimately focus on the prevalence and cumulative impact of co-occurring neuropsychological and psychiatric conditions including PTSD, TBI, depression, and substance intoxication/addiction on the veteran’s mental state at the time of the violent act(s). The forensic neuropsychologist may also offer valuable insight into the complex emotional, behavioral, and neuropsychological effects and function of brain injury and PTSD in relation to a veteran’s propensity for violence.

Issues related to behavioral dyscontrol, impulsivity, dissociation, paranoia, suicidality, and intoxication are germane to both TBI, PTSD, and other comorbid conditions that are prevalent with intense combat related military service.

Three major areas of forensic assessment with TBI and PTSD in military related criminal justice cases include diminished capacity, self-defense, insanity, and mitigation. Essentially, all these forensic referral questions address the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense. 

Diminished Capacity

In military cases, the effects of TBI and or PTSD on one’s emotional, behavioral, and cognitive functioning can be applied to the mens rea elements of a violent crime.

Diminished capacity in criminal cases is typically recognized as whether the defendant, due to mental disease and/or defect, had the capacity to form the requisite mental state constituting a crime. This proposition is supported by opinions issued from the Courts of Appeal.

In Jackson v. State,1 diminished capacity was presented as a failure-of-proof claim. The prosecution failed to prove that the defendant had the required state of mind at the time of the offense. To counter the prosecution’s evidence of the defendant’s culpable state of mind, the defense may present evidence that the defendant has mental or physical impairments or abnormalities and that some of his abilities are lessened in comparison to someone without such problems.

Evidence of mental disease or defect that directly rebuts a particular mens rea necessary for the charged offense can be presented by either lay or expert witnesses. In Lizcano v. State,2 the Court recognized diminished capacity with mental health testimony only if it negates any mens rea element. The defense must make a showing of a connection between the defendant’s psychological and neuropsychological functioning and how impairments could negate a mens rea element. 

In Lizcano, the defendant was charged with the offense of capital murder in the shooting death of a police officer. During trial, the trial court excluded evidence related to the defendant’s mental health. On appeal, the defendant argued that the excluded mental health testimony was relevant as to whether, because of mental disease or delusion, the defendant believed he was not shooting at a uniformed police officer. He  further argued that evidence of how paranoid delusions may distort a person’s auditory and visual perceptions is admissible as it relates to the defendant’s intent to shoot a police officer. The Court found there was no suggestion in the trial record that the excluded testimony had anything to do with delusions. Instead, the court concluded the excluded testimony suggested general limitations in cognitive ability and intoxication at the time of the offense as well as general deficits in adaptive functioning. The excluded testimony had relevance only as to whether the defendant’s mental functioning was below normal to some degree. There was no evidence showing a connection between the defendant’s generally low level of mental functioning and his knowledge during the commission of the offense that the victim was a police officer. 

In State v. Ruffin,3 Ruffin was charged with aggravated assault after shooting at police officers. At the time of the shooting, he believed the officers were trespassers and Muslims rather than police officers. At trial, the psychologist for the defense testified that Ruffin suffered from delusions and opined that he was suffering from psychotic symptoms such as auditory and visual hallucinations at the time of the offense. The trial court found the testimony of the psychologist was relevant and admissible to rebut the mens rea element of the offense. In essence, the Court emphasized that any expert testimony regarding diminished capacity and mens rea issues during the guilt and innocence phase of the trial must not only focus on mental illness, psychiatric symptoms, level of functioning, and possible brain damage and dysfunction, but there must also be a showing of how those symptoms and impairments specifically negate the defendant’s mens rea. 

Similarly, in Nikmanesh v. State,4 the Court of Appeals found the trial court did not err in excluding psychiatric evidence where expert testimony concerning the defendant’s behavior, depressive disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder could only offer an explanation or motive for his actions but could not negate intent for an offense of murder. 

Ultimately, diminished capacity mental health testimony not directly rebutting intent will not be admitted in Texas courts.5 An expert witness in a case where PTSD and TBI are present must not only present testimony on symptoms of psychiatric disorder and neurocognitive impairments of brain disorder but apply this information to the defendant’s incapability of forming intent to commit the act or incapability of acting with knowledge of their conduct and its consequences.6 Presenting expert testimony only on symptoms, conditions, diagnoses, and impairments without applying this data to the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense(s), and specifically to their intent, will not be permitted.

Information as to mitigating mental state evidence of PTSD and/or TBI in military and civilian cases can assist the trier of fact in appreciating the defendant’s mental state and history. In many violent murder and assault cases defendants have a profound history of abuse, neglect, early trauma, and complex trauma suffered through childhood, histories of psychiatric disorders, and dual-diagnostic disorders with chemical dependency and addiction. The military servicemen and women who commit violent crimes often have these same traumatic and dysfunctional histories, but they also may have military trauma histories related to PTSD and brain injury. 

Additionally, in cases with genuine military-based trauma often suffered and acquired through combat, the trier of fact may recognize mitigating factors regarding service to country. Reporting this trauma through presentation of forensic expert reports is also bolstered by providing the trier of fact with VA and military records which may provide even more legitimacy of the trauma. 

Case Studies

In a case of diminished capacity, this author examined a 22-year-old non-military defendant charged with two counts of aggravated assault of a public servant with a deadly weapon and evading arrest/detention in a motor vehicle. The defendant’s father had a traumatic brain injury causing him severe anger problems, and he physically abused the defendant. The defendant also had prior acts of violence towards family members. The defendant suffered from a childhood history of ADHD and early behavioral problems, and there were early concerns about autism spectrum disorder. Once he reached adulthood, he was more floridly psychotic with a schizophrenia diagnosis and experienced auditory hallucinations and paranoid delusions. 

The evening of the offense, the defendant was paranoid and psychotic and was audio and video recording family members due to his paranoia. Arguing ensued between the defendant and his father and grandfather, and the defendant yelled out that he had to leave because of the demons. He ran out of the house, got into a car, and started driving in an acute psychotic state. The family had called 911, and the police responded immediately. The defendant was driving erratically, and the officer perceived the defendant driving toward him and felt threatened, attempted to stop the car by moving to the other lane, and utlimately steered his vehicle toward the defendant’s car, ramming it to its halt. The officer got out of the car and grabbed the defendant’s passenger door handle when the defendant failed to follow the officer’s commands. The officer fired his weapon twice as the defendant’s vehicle approached him.

During a 7027 hearing at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the author’s testimony addressed the defendant’s mental state at the time of the alleged offense. The defendant was significantly compromised by his mental conditions related to schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, active paranoid delusions, auditory hallucinations, PTSD, and ADHD. Also present was the hyperarousal and fight/flight phenomenon. These disorders would impair an individual’s cognitive functioning, ultimate problem solving, and decision-making skills in a time of heightened stress, extreme paranoia, and perceived threat. The testimony was admitted by the court to inform the jury as to how these psychiatric symptoms collectively negated the defendant’s mental state to commit aggravated assault against a police officer. 

In another Texas case, this author examined a 61-year-old Vietnam veteran charged with online solicitation of a minor under age 14. He served one tour in Vietnam where he witnessed and experienced significant war-related trauma, and as a result, there was evidence of PTSD and severe alcoholism, depression, and anxiety. The was also evidence of childhood neurodevelopmental disorder. He had treatment and disability through the VA for mental health conditions. He suffered one traumatic brain injury after the war from an assault and another when he was hit by a car. The trial court judge held a 702 hearing and allowed mental health testimony regarding the defendant’s mental state and intent as to following through with solicitation type text messages to a minor girl. Essentially, the author examined and testified to significant brain dysfunction, neurocognitive and neurodevelopmental disorders, coupled with his mental illness and how these disorders in collection compromised his mental state and negated his intent regarding solicitation, as well as testimony regarding his intent in carrying out any type of sexual acts with the victim. 

Sudden Passion, Manslaughter, and Criminal Homicide

Another area of criminal law where PTSD and TBI evidence may apply is in the defense of criminal homicide (Texas Penal Code §19.01).8 “Criminal Homicide” covers the offenses of Murder (§19.02), Capital Murder (§19.03), Manslaughter (§19.04), and Criminally Negligent Homicide (§19.05). 

Pursuant to §19.02, a person commits the offense of murder if he: 

  1. Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;
  2. Intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes death of an individual; or
  3. Commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of an in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in the immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. 

Murder is a first-degree felony with a range of punishment of 5-99 years or Life in the Texas Department of Corrections (TDC). Should the defense prove the defendant acted with “sudden passion” the jury may sentence the defendant as if it were a second-degree felony, which has a range of punishment of 2-20 years in TDC. “Sudden passion” means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed, which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation. 

Critical to murder cases is an instruction for manslaughter. Under §19.04, a person commits the offense of manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. Mental health and brain behavior-based PTSD and TBI evidence may apply to negate a defendant’s intentionally or knowingly causing the death of an individual. The conditions, symptoms, and impairments of PTSD and TBI apply well with reckless behavior. Per §6.03(c), a person is reckless when they are aware of the risks surrounding their conduct and of the results that could occur but consciously disregard that awareness. Importantly, the risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint. The crime does not require an element of premeditation, intent, or knowledge, only that a person is reckless. 

PTSD and TBI can affect several critical domains of functioning at or around the time of violent acts leaving an individual vulnerable to misperceiving provocation, overreacting, and becoming impulsive and reckless in their reactions and behavior. Some of these domains include cognition, emotion, behavior, and physiological arousal. PTSD and TBI can also dramatically affect the way an individual perceives, processes, and responds to people and situations. These conditions place individuals at risk for paranoia, impulsivity, deficient problem solving, and deficits in cool reflection with poor appreciation of consequences. 

Critical neural circuitry areas of the brain and in particular, the areas regarding impulse control, learning from experience, problem solving, and decision making are especially susceptible to PTSD and TBI. An individual with PTSD and/or TBI, but especially both together, can misperceive threat and provocation due to a number of issues including paranoia, deficient emotional processing, and behavioral regulation.


Another area of mental state evidence and the law in which psychological and neuropsychological evidence can be considered is self-defense.9 Under Texas Penal Code 9.31, self-defense can be invoked when “a person is justified in using force against another when he believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.”  Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears the burden of production. He must present some evidence of a specific apparent danger and that the use of force or deadly force was reasonable and necessary to avoid the danger.10 The reasonableness of the actor’s belief that force or deadly force is immediately necessary is judged from the standpoint of an ordinary person under the same circumstances as the actor. A person “has a right to defend from apparent danger to the same extent as he would had the danger been real; provided that he acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to him at the time.”11 The defense attorney may argue that their client’s PTSD, complex trauma, or TBI related brain damage/dysfunction are circumstances that must be considered by the trier of fact in a self-defense case.

A veteran suffering from PTSD/TBI is at particular risk to have a compromised fight/flight system. Evidence of complex trauma and PTSD place a veteran at risk to misperceive threat, to be constantly on edge, hypervigilant, and in an overstimulated and impulsive state. Those with TBI often have faulty brakes to balance the impulsive threat response system. 

Case Study

In a self-defense trial, this author examined a 74-year-old Vietnam veteran charged with murder. The defendant was accused of murdering his neighbor who was also a Vietnam veteran, and with whom for several years, he shared a chronic tumultuous history. The defendant perceived death threats from the neighbor, and on the day of the shooting, he said the victim assaulted him on his own property by punching and striking him multiple times. He also perceived the victim pulling out a weapon (an aluminum cane) and threatening the defendant and yelling that he wished the defendant would die. While the defendant was trying to retreat, the victim continued punching him, which led to a mutual fight. There was a verbal and physical argument over the weapon. While the victim was beating him with the cane, the defendant pulled out a gun and shot and killed the victim. During my examination the defendant said, “When I pulled the trigger I was in fear for my life.” 

The defendant had a history of trauma prior to his war experiences which led to his PTSD symptoms. His biological father had a history of alcohol use and abuse and died of cirrhosis of the liver when the defendant was age 6. The defendant then lived in an extremely dysfunctional household with his mother, who had evidence of mental illness, and his grandparents. The defendant only completed ninth grade, and he had problems with school achievement. The defendant served as a combat infantry soldier in both the Korean and Vietnam wars. He completed one tour in Korea and three tours in Vietnam, where he earned a Bronze Star and Purple Heart. During his tours of duty, he suffered severe traumatic stress including being shot at, witnessing people getting killed, killing others in the line of duty, and experiencing traumatic brain injury. The veteran did not receive any assessment or treatment for his PTSD during either war.

When he returned to the United States, he had florid PTSD symptoms and evidence of domestic violence with his wife and extreme difficulties with chronic intrusive memories, flashbacks, and nightmares. He worked as a security guard in a prison where he experienced further trauma and multiple concussions. He qualified for a dual-diagnosis condition as he became an alcoholic when returning from Korea and was chronically drinking until age 65 when finally, he gained sobriety. He received full disability from the VA for PTSD and other medical conditions.

The neuropsychological assessment conducted indicated mild to moderate neurocognitive deficits in several areas including memory, executive functioning, and attention. He qualified for evidence of PTSD, major depressive disorder, and mild to major neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injury and other vascular medical risk factors, as well as the chronic effects of alcohol use on brain functioning.

The court requested a 702 hearing, and the author testified in this hearing that the defendant was suffering from severe PTSD and a mild to moderate neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injuries and a dementing condition as well as an early neurodevelopmental disorder, and further, that these conditions ultimately affected his mental state at the time of the offense, particularly regarding a self-defense claim.

The trier of fact then must consider evidence relevant to the same circumstances of the actor. Accordingly, the trial court found this author’s testimony admissible as applied  to the defendant and agreed that despite the ordinary person standard, the jury should be allowed to specifically hear testimony as to the same circumstances as the actor (defendant’s mental, psychiatric, and neuropsychiatric conditions, evidence of psychiatric symptoms and brain dysfunction that included executive functioning impairments pertaining to problem solving and impulse control ultimately detrimentally impacting his fight/flight response system). 


Under Texas Penal Code § 8.01, “it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.” The term “mental disease or defect” does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.”12

In Texas, the wrongfulness standard is typically a cognitive knowing standard and does not include the emotional and affective standard used in federal insanity law. Regarding the latter, the Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA) of 1984 reads, “at the time of the commission of the acts constituted in the offense, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, they were unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of their acts.13 This statute does have some potential consideration of affective and emotional states related to mental illness and does remove the volitional component that the American Law Institute (ALI) insanity defense has regarding the defendant lacking the capacity to conform their conduct to the law.14 Both the IDRA and ALI insanity tests open the door to emotional and volitional issues that the typical cognitive “knowing wrongfulness” test lacks.

Due to the narrow cognitive knowing of wrongfulness test, it is difficult to prevail on many insanity defense cases. Typically, an individual who does not know right from wrong will be in a psychotic, manic/psychotic, or demented mental state at the time of the offense. Concerning PTSD, if an individual is in a profound dissociative state with potential evidence of depersonalization and/or derealization, there may be a better chance for an insanity defense. When an individual is dissociating and has recurrent feelings of being detached and dissociated from one’s body mind processes, usually with the feeling of being outside of themselves, including being an observer of one’s life or being detached from one’s body/mind feelings and/or sensations, they may have a compromised capacity in knowing the wrongfulness and illegality of their offenses. 

Depersonalization is when an individual feels detached from one’s body, mind, feelings, and/or sensations, while derealization occurs when an individual feels detached from their surroundings, such as people, objects, events, and they perceive things as being unreal. When these two symptom clusters of depersonalization and derealization occur together the individual may feel detached from their own self and perceive that things are unreal. These severe dissociative traits are close in replica of a psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia in which an individual has hallucinations or delusions and they lack contact from reality. In essence, the symptoms of depersonalization and derealization may lead an individual to not perceive that they are in contact with reality. Further, in many cases of PTSD, the defendant will suffer from other psychiatric disorders and/or TBI which may have a cumulative effect with the PTSD symptoms on their overall functioning and capacity in knowing the wrongfulness of their acts.

In Kemp v. State,15 a Vietnam veteran shot his wife in bed and pled not guilty by reason of insanity. He stated that he was dreaming of being surrounded by Viet Cong, and this dreaming episode certainly would have been an intrusive symptom of PTSD. The defense did not prevail, and the defendant appealed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered a new trial in the interest of justice on the single issue of the defendant’s special plea of not guilty by reason of insanity or lack of mental responsibility at the time of the act. The doctor called by the defendant and two court appointed witnesses all testified that the defendant was legally insane, and two doctors called by the state stated they could not form an opinion, while one doctor called for the state testified that he did not have an opinion but that maybe the defendant did lack mental responsibility. 

In cases like this, the most ideal insanity case with PTSD should include the defendant experiencing a dissociative traumatic type episode that is reminiscent of a prior trauma experience. A defendant who commits a violent act who is dissociating at the time of the offense would have an enhanced defense if he were perceiving a similar trauma that he had experienced before. In essence, the trauma at the time of the instant offense ideally will be reminiscent of the earlier trauma(s). 

In a case closer to home in the Lonestar State, American Sniper Chris Kyle was shot and killed by Eddie Ray Ruth. The defendant was a former Marine who had been given a diagnosis of PTSD and spent time in several hospitals being treated for mental illness and was even prescribed antipsychotic medication. Mr. Ruth also used a not guilty by reason of insanity defense. His defense included his portrayal of being in a psychotic episode when he shot and killed Kyle in Littlefield at a gun range in February of 2013. Ruth’s insanity defense failed, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. The failure of the defense was due in part to the defendant’s problems with drugs and alcohol and because the State’s experts opined that he was exaggerating mental illness during the examinations. 

Mitigation of Military and Civilian PTSD and TBI

Perhaps the most common process of utilizing forensic psychological and neuropsychological evidence of PTSD and TBI in military and non-military civilian cases is through mitigation evaluations/packages provided to the prosecution, court, and/or jury through forensic reports and/or testimony. Mitigating evidence about a defendant’s background, character, and characteristics of his offense is relevant because, pursuant to “evolving standards of decency” in our society, such factors speak to one’s moral culpability.16

Mitigation evaluations are utilized by the defense to provide the prosecution information outside of the criminal offenses and can be used to educate them as to the defendant’s background history, ultimately relating to moral culpability. These evaluations often assist the defense in the plea negotiation process. 

In the absence of specific direction and guidance from statutes or sentencing guidelines, numerous federal and state decisions have recognized PTSD as a mitigating factor when the offender is a military veteran. 

In Porter v. McCollum,17 the United States Supreme Court held that the lawyer’s failure to present evidence of PTSD connected to military service during the sentencing phase of a capital case constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court emphasized the importance of recognizing the defendant’s service to his country, “Our nation has a long tradition of affording leniency to veterans and recognition of their service, especially for those who fought on the front lines.” The Court also associated the concepts of PTSD in military service, “the relevance of…combat experience…is that the jury might find mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took on the offender.” Also emphasized, was the importance of the defendant’s military service as a part of a general policy relevant to leniency to war veterans while recognizing the psychological trauma stemming from combat experience, the latter which could have diminished the offender’s capacity to form the requisite intent in committing the crime. 

In the United States v. Brownfield,18 a federal judge in a non-capital case sentenced the defendant to five years of probation and ordered a psychiatric evaluation for a military-based PTSD condition and explained that the case involved issues the federal sentencing guidelines do not address regarding the criminal justice system’s treatment of returning veterans who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

When considering non-capital federal cases, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 allows departure from the sentencing minimums for “extraordinary mental condition.” In federal court, diminished capacity is identified pertaining to a reduced sentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines rather than a formal defense during the guilt/innocence phase of a trial. According to the § 5K2.13 diminished capacity policy statement, it provides for a downward departure if: 1) the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity; 2) the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense.

Further, the advisory guidelines also note downward departure may be warranted based on military service, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11-Military service may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines. A downward departure may be pursued pertinent to mental and emotional conditions, U.S.S.G. § 5H.13. According to § 5H.13, mental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, as such conditions, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, present to an unusual degree and that distinguish a case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines. In certain cases, downward departure may be appropriate to accomplish a specific treatment purpose (this could be related to a veteran obtaining specialized PTSD and/or TBI veteran-based treatment). Mental and emotional conditions could be relevant in determining the conditions of probation with supervised release; e.g., participation in a mental health program. Therefore, there are different avenues in federal court to argue downward departure pertaining to special veteran circumstances. 

When returning veterans with no prior criminal history run afoul of the law federal judges have the power pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) to structure sentences that facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration.

In United States v. Cantu,19 the Ninth Circuit held that combat-related PTSD was the type of “mental condition” that would qualify a defendant for a downward departure for “diminished capacity” under U.S.S.G. §5K2.13. The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty concluding that PTSD is a qualifying disorder for “diminished capacity”:

Cantu’s post-traumatic stress disorder is a grave affliction. Its effect on his mental processes is undisputed. He has flashbacks to scenes of combat. He suffers nightmares, intrusive thoughts[,] and intrusive images. He is anxious, depressed, full of rage, markedly paranoid, and explosive at times.

The psychologist’s report shows that Cantu’s condition interfered substantially with his ability to make reasoned decisions, causing him to fixate on weapons and rely on them for feelings of personal safety and security. Cantu’s impairment is more than sufficient to make him eligible for a reduction in sentence under §5K2.13.20 The Court went on to explain that “the disorder need be only a contributing cause, not a but-for cause or a sole cause of the offense.” This policy statement, since amended, now requires that the disorder “substantially contribute” to defendant’s commission of the offense. If a departure is warranted under this policy statement, the extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense.

This author examined a defendant who was charged in federal court with multiple counts of  bank robbery. The defendant graduated from college and served as a front-line medic in the military and experienced/witnessed profound war related trauma, IED blasts, murders, killings, and earned numerous decorated medals from his service in Afghanistan and Iraq. When he returned to the United States, he experienced profound PTSD, major depression, and an inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. He exhibited significant neuropsychological impairments despite strong verbal and overall IQ scores. He became addicted to opiates, alcohol, and cannabis in addition to his impairments due to PTSD. He also had a history of concussions pre-dating his military service. 

Case Study

The defendant went on a bank robbery spree and described his motive as to achieve a euphoria and “wanted to feel something” like he felt in Iraq. He did not appear to be planning the offenses, but his motivation was again to achieve a sense of euphoria and rush. There was a disconnect between his emotions, thoughts, and behaviors, which certainly was related to his chronic PTSD condition. 

When holding up the bank tellers he lacked an appreciation as to how his behaviors affected others as he focused only on the stimulating, arousing, and inebriating effects that his actions had on him. He had a gun in the bank and said, “It did not seem like a gun or weapon…it was a like a TV remote…I was programmed to not feel emotion due to my war experiences…I eventually did not feel anything…I never considered what I did was really terrorizing anyone.” His impaired ability to feel, regulate, and process his emotions probably led to a diminished empathy for the victims and deficits in feeling remorse as well as a compromised ability to appreciate the severity and consequences of his behaviors. 

While he understood the wrongfulness of his behaviors, he had difficulty appreciating the quality of his behaviors pursuant to the Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA). In particular, he lacked an emotional appreciation of how his behaviors were affecting others. The defendant had suffered from flashbacks involving alteration of consciousness, and he believed he was re-experiencing a traumatic situation when he was committing the bank robberies. These flashbacks, along with nightmares and intrusive memories, led to heightened emotional stress and to low autonomic activity.

While the defense did not raise an insanity defense, they did focus on his PTSD, major depressive conditions, and the neurocognitive deficits from the PTSD condition that placed him at risk for a diminished ability to choose and completely refrain from his behaviors. He was stimulation-seeking, reckless, impulsive, and found himself escalating these behaviors in frequency closer in time to the arrest. 

Despite his intelligence, the veteran’s PTSD condition had altered the functional and neural circuitry of his brain. The neuropsychological assessment revealed significant attention, memory, and executive deficits leaving him impulsive, seeking sensation and intense adrenaline producing experiences with deficits in regulating behavior and appreciating the consequences of his behaviors onto others.21

This defendant was experiencing heightened emotions, including anxiety, fear, guilt, depression, anger, shame, and he would suffer acute emotional reactions when he was exposed to reminders of his wartime traumatic events. Consequently, he utilized drugs to combat and self-medicate these negative emotions focusing his use on opiates to numb his hyper-aroused and traumatic states. 

Ultimately, under USSG § 5K2.0 federal law allows departure from the sentencing minimums for “extraordinary mental conditions.”22 The federal district court recognized this forensic psychological and neuropsychological data in the form of a sentencing mitigation package and sentenced him to 108 months despite him committing up to 12 bank robberies within a six-week span.

Brief Neuroscience Admissibility Issues

Forensic psychological and neuropsychological assessment, the specific testing and results, and testimony related to forensic legal issues such as first phase mental state evidence and mitigation are typically admissible. Courts will admit evidence deemed “relevant” as defined by Texas Rule of Evidence 401, which states that “Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. However, Rule 403 allows a trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Although forensic psychological and neuropsychological assessment techniques themselves are typically admitted, the application of psychiatric diagnosis, functional neuropsychological and psychological impairments and symptoms, and their relationship to mental state evidence obviously can be contested by legal parties. The defense must be clear in a 702 hearing how mental health evidence, especially diagnostic symptoms and functional impairments, relate to the specific legal issue(s) in mind such as negating intent related to mens rea and diminished capacity or the standard of ordinary person in a self-defense claim. There should be a nexus between the diagnostic symptoms, functional capacity and impairments, and the law. 


While there appear to be more objections to the admissibility of neuroimaging cases in criminal court, neuroimaging evidence can be considered in both PTSD and traumatic brain injury. Neuroimaging in non-murder cases may not be as technically specific and intricate as in murder and death penalty cases in large part due to cost and funding. The most useful neuroimaging techniques include voxel-based morphometry (VBM) (volumetric MRI) functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), PET scan, and diffuse tensor imaging (DTI). 

In its basics, neuroscientists can measure focal brain volumes with VBM which is an MRI technique that allows for the investigation of focal differences in brain anatomy.23 Essentially, a brain’s image is divided into hundreds of thousands of cubes, and a computerized algorithm quantifies total brain tissue, including gray and white matter and water. The individual’s brain data is then statistically compared with data derived from normal control subjects without neurological and psychiatric disorders and impaired cube brain tissue data. 

With DTI, this is an MRI neuroimaging technique examining the location, orientation, and variations in the brain’s white matter tracts which is important in examining how critical areas of the brain are interconnected. The DTI specifically looks at brain fiber tracks and neural circuitry that connects a variety of brain regions and offers data as to the integrity or damage of these fibers.24  These brain fiber tracks are needed in processing and communicating information to other areas of the brain.

fMRI is an imaging tool for determining which regions of the brain are working, their efficiency by detecting changes associated with cerebral blood flow, especially during cognitive tasks. 

PET scan is a neuroimaging test that includes the use of tracers which are attached to compounds such as glucose which is the main fuel of the brain. The PET scan can detect which areas of the brain are utilizing glucose at the highest rates and which ones are deficient or impaired.25

There are a number of studies addressing the neuroimaging in posttraumatic stress disorder.26 These studies have indicated the amygdala, hippocampus, and medial prefrontal cortex, including the anterior cingulate in PTSD. These areas of the brain are critical for emotional and fear/threat processing, paranoia, traumatic memories, planning, decision making, processing of emotions, and language for example. It is these areas that are often victimized by traumatic brain injury especially the prefrontal cortex, and there can be a double dose effect with a veteran or civilian with both PTSD and TBI. 

The trial court will often have a 702 hearing in which the forensic neuropsychologist will testify about the defendant’s background history, psychosocial and mental health background, the nature of the psychological and neuropsychological testing especially related to function impairments, as well as psychiatric diagnoses. The court will allow the forensic psychologist and neuropsychologist to testify about the defendant’s behaviors, including violence, as well as the forensic legal issues concerning the insanity, diminished capacity, mitigation, etc. The trier of fact may also allow the forensic neuropsychologist (not psychologist) to testify to neuropsychological testing data, brain behavior relationships, including the criminal and violent behavior, as well as the relationship between the neuropsychological testing results and the neuroimaging. The neuropsychologist can testify to not only the brain functions related to the tests themselves but also what regions of the brain the tests may measure. Similarly, the forensic neuropsychologist can testify to the connections between the neuropsychological testing results and to the neuroimaging results, as well as potentially to the psychiatric diagnoses and the neuroimaging results. 

Neuroscientific experts, such as neurologists, neuroscientists, and neuroradiologists will specifically be allowed to testify as to the neuroimaging process and results, as well as neuropathology, but courts often will not allow these experts to delve into criminal behavior or forensic issues as to insanity or diminished capacity. 

In a death penalty case this author examined, the defendant was a former police officer who served six tours as a civilian in a Middle East war zone where he suffered brain injury and later suffered from symptoms of PTSD. The defendant’s mental state deteriorated over time when returning to the United States on leave. He continued to become more impulsive and rageful in benign events, he misperceived threats, and was involved in a road rage incident. The other party to the road rage called the sheriff’s department who attempted to arrest the defendant following the road rage incident. The sheriff tried to gain entrance into the defendant’s home, and the defendant overreacted to his misperceived threat and shot and killed the sheriff.

The neuroimaging data indicated brain damage and shrinkage that could be a consequence of TBI, seizure disorder, PTSD, and/or delusional disorder. 

Psychological testing results yielded conditions consistent with clinical interview and background information relevant to PTSD and delusional disorder. Neuropsychological testing revealed evidence of significant brain dysfunction consistent with PTSD, traumatic brain injury, and an early dementing condition. There was a complete alignment between the structural neuroimaging data and the functional neuropsychological assessment data explaining an ultimate subcortical-cortical process of reactive aggression and violence. 

Essentially, the defendant was in a constant state of paranoia and misperceived threat, was impulsive and easily angered, and was cognitively deteriorating. He had a fight/flight condition regarding his brain neural circuitry and function. The forensic psychological and neuropsychological information and testimony was put forth in the mitigation phase of the court case rather than the guilt-innocence phase, ultimately yielding a life without parole outcome.  

Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Management

Veterans returning for war are at risk for criminal justice involvement, as well as trauma.27 Veterans with probable PTSD or TBI who reported anger and/or irritability are more likely to be arrested than other veterans, and they are at higher risk for aggression and violence. 

As part of a mitigation package, the defense may also request a violence risk assessment and risk management examination by the forensic psychologist/neuropsychologist. This violence risk assessment may be relevant to cases including other assault and violent non-murder cases. The forensic psychologist/neuropsychologist conducting risk assessment should certainly have a handle and experience relevant to the proper examination of violence risk assessment. 

A solid mitigation package is not only useful in figuring out and assessing what is wrong with the defendant, what psychiatric disorders they have, and how their brain is functioning, but also helpful on what to do with a defendant pertinent to risk management issues. Services and plans, living situations, personal and social support, as well as potential stressors need to be considered in this examination process. 

It is important to emphasize a focused and specialized risk assessment for violence with military veterans.28 Forensic evaluation should consider a dispositional, historical, clinical, and contextual risk factor analysis and assessment. 

Dispositional factors are basic demographics related to risk of violence and can include young age, male status, personality traits, aggressive attitudes, and low intelligence. 

Historical factors may include pre-deployment violence and criminal offenses, history of domestic violence, history of child abuse, witnessing domestic violence as a youth, dysfunctional family of origin, substance use, violent events experienced during deployment, and combat exposure.

Clinical factors can include PTSD and prior trauma, high PTSD symptom severity, TBI, substance use, low intelligence, depression, suicidality, and in particular the PTSD symptoms of irritability, low frustration tolerance, and hyperarousal. 

Contextual factors also may include single marital status, unemployment, financial difficulties, relationship problems, and newer marriages.

Treating the Veteran

There are a number of treatments to assist the veteran returning from combat. Obviously, there are a number of conditions to treat and especially are related to polytrauma (PTSD, TBI, chronic pain, and mental illness, especially major depressive disorder and substance dependence). Importantly, the potential of addressing impulsive aggression in treatment is critical through building emotional regulation skills with both individual and group therapies. Psychological treatment options may include skills, training, and affective interpersonal regulation, cognitive behavioral therapy, and dialectical behavioral therapy. Psychiatric medication management is often necessary to treat psychiatric and brain disorder symptoms affecting emotional, behavioral, and cognitive functioning.

Concluding Remarks

This article has addressed the unique issue of examining military motivated murder and violence. The information above in both Parts I and II, especially related to the assessment and diagnosis of PTSD and TBI, certainly can be applied to civilian cases, too. Further, the author cannot overemphasize the prevalence of early childhood trauma and the comorbidity of chemical dependency in military and civilian PTSD and TBI cases. 

Along these lines, this author sets forth a tri-diagnosis phenomenon that includes not only the typical dual-diagnosis and presence of psychiatric disorder and mental illness with chemical dependency and addiction, but as a third component of brain dysfunction, which often is present in these cases pertaining to traumatic brain injury and/or neurodevelopmental disorders present in offenders (early disorders of compromise in brain development, i.e., learning disorder, ADHD, intellectual disability, and autism spectrum disorder). 

The attorneys and court systems involved in these cases certainly have a heavy hand in dealing with such complexities in human behavior, brain behavioral relationships, and evidentiary tools such as neuroimaging when considering guilt, innocence, and moral culpability issues when working with these populations. 

In some Texas jurisdictions there are veteran treatment courts29 that allow for specialized handling for veterans involved in criminal court cases that consider coordinated systems of court supervised treatment that ensures accountability while empowering veterans to become an integral and productive member of their community. The veteran’s court dockets often provide programs that utilize evidence-based practices that assist veterans in getting mental health and chemical dependency treatment and vocation and employment training and experiences while providing risk management and rehabilitative efforts with an ultimate goal of preventing re-offending. 

The expert and lawyer should attempt to consult with the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs and the Veteran’s Justice Outreach Program which is designed to avoid the unnecessary criminalization of mental illness and extended incarceration among veterans by ensuring that eligible, justice involved veterans have timely access to Veterans Health Administration (VHA) services. Veteran’s Justice Outreach specialists can provide direct outreach assessment and case management for justice involved veterans in local courts and jails and liaison with the local justice system partners.30 Along these lines, veteran treatment courts are another viable option to assess and monitor the criminogenic and mental health, as well as chemical dependency treatment needs for veterans involved in the criminal justice system. 

Imperative to assessment and management of risk is the consideration of the tri-diagnosis related to mental illness and frequently PTSD, major depression, with co-occurring substance dependence, and TBI. The potential mediating influence of substance use, mental health, and combat and other trauma experiences has significant implications for preventing criminal aggressive behavior among U.S. active duty military personnel.31

Ultimately, the Global War on Terrorism has had great consequences on the mental health of troops returning to the U.S. post-war service. The risk of experiencing psychiatric, neurological, and chemical dependency issues is profound and ultimately places the veteran in jeopardy of committing violent acts and landing in the criminal justice system. Proper forensic mental health assessment is vital for the best representation and equitable treatment of the veteran.

First! COVID-19 Jury Selection

On Friday, March 13, 2020 I mailed out 85 letters to clients informing them that COVID-19 had forced a shutdown of the court system in Texas, and I did not know what that meant for their case other than it would most certainly affect any preexisting timeline.

On August 25, 2020 (Tuesday) I received an e-mail informing me that I was in the “Strike Zone” for a jury trial, and jury selection would begin on August 31, 2020 at nine a.m. 

On August 28, 2020 (Friday) the court called a jury docket in the 124th District Court room. Five of us defense counsel had gathered having been given the notice of being in the “Strike Zone.” 

  • The first attorney asked for continuance believing that there was some sort of discovery issue with foreign judgments from Mexico.  The case was passed.
  • The next attorney had recently suffered a family tragedy, and the court sua sponte passed those cases.
  • The third lawyer announced that their client would be waiving a jury, and the case was being set for an open guilty plea to the bench.
  • I argued my hastily thrown together Motion for Continuance that was based on the TCDLA Motion due to COVID-19. The motion was denied.
  • The last attorney on the list had his case passed due to witness issues.

August 29, 2020

  • TCDLA past president David Moore reached out to me offering trial strategy, put me in touch with Allison Clayton, the head of the TCDLA COVID-19 Taskforce, and encouraged me to find somebody to second chair at jury selection. 
  • J. Brandt Thorson agreed to help me second chair jury selection.

On Sunday, August 30, 2020 Allison and I started collaborating in earnest getting creative about filing a beefed-up Motion for Continuance with multiple Exhibits attached and a CCP 35.06 challenge to the array.

  • Exhibit A: May 27, 2020 Newspaper article about COVID-19 in the Gregg County jail 
  • Exhibit B: White Oak Independent School District press release that in person school was suspended due to COVID-19 from August 27, 2020 – September 9, 2020
  • Exhibit C: State Bar of Texas Presidential Task Force Interim Recommendations as of 8-26-2020
  • Exhibit D: August 31, 2020 trial docket for the 124th District Court
  • Exhibit E: August 27, 2020 Newspaper article that jury trials were to resume

Monday, August 31, 2020, voir dire at the Maude Cobb Convention Center, Longview, Texas.

  • Challenged the array per CCP 35.06. Denied
  • Argued the new Motion for Continuance with Exhibits A-E attached. Denied.
  • Selected what many have called “a good-looking jury.”

After voir dire it was pointed out to me that my case was not on the “approved jury trials” list as published by the Office of Court Administration. 

So, on Tuesday, September 1, 2020, I drafted and filed a Motion for Continuance based on the fact that my trial was not on the “OCA Approved List” with attached Exhibits.

  • Exhibit F: Emergency Orders Twenty-Two
  • Exhibit G: PDF of Approved Jury Trial list from the OCA website.
  • Argued Motion. Denied.
  • Gave Evidence to the Jury.

Wednesday, September 2, 2020, second day of trial

  • Gave the charge to the jury sometime in mid-morning.
  • Guilty verdict
  • Brief punishment phase
  • State asked for max (20 years). I told them that they knew what to do.
  • Gave punishment charge to jury.
  • Jury assessed 4 years TDC.

On Thursday, September 3, 2020 my Client waived appeal. I called and texted a few people to let them know that we would not be making good case law out of my trial.

Tuesday, September 8, 2020, I briefed the TCDLA Board for about an hour about my experience and provided the checklist at the end of this timeline for future reference.


Then, on Tuesday, September 15, 2020, I received another e-mail letting me know that I was again in the “Strike Zone” for another jury trial to be selected on September 21, 2020 at nine a.m.

Wednesday, September 16, 2020, I share my Motion for Continuance Due to Lack of OCA approval with J. Brandt Thorson.

Thursday, September 17, 2020, I file (multiple) Motions for Continuance with Exhibits attached.

Friday, September 18, 2020, went to trial docket and witnesses the following.

  • Lawyer #1 had his Continuance granted due to settings in Federal Court.
  • Lawyer #2 (me) had his Motions for Continuance denied.
  • Lawyer #3 Had his Continuance approved on Thursday, due to Evidence issues.
  • Lawyer #4 fled the State on vacation, leaving a letter on file with the Court.
  • Lawyer #5 Set their case for a Motion to Suppress.

Monday, September 21, 2020, jury selection at Maude Cobb Convention Center, Longview, Texas.

  • Sung Kim sat second chair with me.
  • We picked what was considered another “good-looking jury.”

Tuesday, September 22, 2020, Trial

  • Sung Kim sat at counsel table as second chair.
  • Jury returned a Guilty Verdict by 2:30 PM.
  • Client waived Jury as to Punishment.
  • Punishment reset until November 13, 2020.


Then, on Friday, September 25, 2020, the third jury trial docket since COVID-19 was held, and I was not on it. 

  • Jeff Jackson found out he was going to trial.
  • I called Jeff to offer to sit second chair during voir dire.

Monday, September 28, 2020, voir dire, Maude Cobb Convention Center.

  • Many quizzical looks from Courthouse Security as to why I was there.
  • Mr. Gary Cristian, thanked us for what looked like “an amazing Jury.”

Wednesday, September 30, 2020, 3:00 PM.

  • Word got out, Not Guilty! 

COVID-19 Checklist

  1. Is your trial approved by the OCA?
  2. If your client is incarcerated:
    1. Has your client been tested?
    2. Has your client been in quarantine since testing?
    3. What are the number of active cases in the jail?
    4. How many inmates are in quarantine in the jail?
  3. Off-Site Voir Dire:
    1. Object that it is not the hallowed halls of justice.
    2. Object that it is not covenant to the populace.
    3. Ask Jurors if they can see you.
  4. Summons:
    1. Does the Jury Summons comport with the Code of Criminal Procedure?
    2. Are jurors excused without having been sworn per CCP 35.02.
  5. Are jail cases of COVID published on the Jail Commission website, or do you need to subpoena them from the sheriff?
  6. Courtroom:
    1. Have the judge on record describe where the jury, counsel, defendant, witnesses, gallery members, and other visitors will sit during the trial.
    2. Enter a drawn schematic of the courtroom into evidence.
    3. Ask if there will be cleaning protocols for the witness stand and trial exhibits.
    4. Will concessions be made so that the attorney and defendant can converse while maintaining good social distancing practices.
    5. Where will the Jury be sequestered to during breaks and during deliberation.
    6. Will the jury be ordered to wear clear plastic facemasks during the trial?
  7. Motions for Continuance; attach exhibits and verify under oath:
    1. OCA approved trial list;
    2. Reports of jail infection rate;
    3. Local newspaper articles about school closures;
    4. Published infection rates for the area;
    5. Press releases from local government and elected officials;
    6. Census records.
  8. Motion to challenge the array under CCP 35.06.
    1. Census records;
    2. In writing;
    3. Verified;
    4. Infection rates for disparaged classes of jurors.
  9. Never announce “Ready.”
  10. Ask for “Running Objection.”
  11. Ask witnesses if they can see all jurors from the witness stand.

A Primer on the Texas EOCA Statute

Many in law enforcement have started more aggressively using the Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity (“EOCA”) statute to prosecute cases where groups of individuals are alleged to have worked together in some way to commit criminal activity. Under the EOCA statute, people can be prosecuted as being part of a “combination” or as part of a “criminal street gang.” The purpose of this article is to outline and survey the law as it pertains to cases filed where the accused is charged as a member of a “combination.”

The EOCA statute, as codified in Chapter 71 of the Texas Penal Code, was created as Texas’ answer to the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute. The legislative history suggests that the bill creating the EOCA statute was intended to make it less difficult for law enforcement officials and criminal justice agencies to obtain convictions for participation in organized crime.1 The EOCA statute allows for joinder of offenses and offenders in a single criminal case. It allows for prosecution in any county in which any activity occurred in furtherance of EOCA activities. Alleging that a person is part of a “combination” works similarly to a criminal conspiracy, except that it involves more people and they need not be as directly involved with one another.

Tex. Pen. Code §71.02(a) says that “[a] person commits an offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination or as a member of a criminal street gang, the person commits or conspires to commit” one of the predicate offenses. The laundry list of offenses is too numerous to list here but it can be found in the statute and includes offenses as diverse as murder, aggravated robbery, various sex offenses, various fraud offenses, certain gambling offenses, money laundering, and many others.2 Texas Penal Code § 71.01(a) defines the term “combination” as “three or more persons who collaborate in carrying on criminal activities, although: (1) participants may not know each other’s identity; (2) membership in the combination may change from time to time, and (3) participants may stand in a wholesaler-retailer or other arm’s length relationship in illicit distribution operations.”

It is important to remember that not all offenses are predicate offenses for an EOCA charge. Therefore, a practitioner should start by referring to the statute and ask the most basic question – does the indictment allege that the defendant committed one of the predicate offenses listed in the statute? If the predicate crime is not one that is listed in the EOCA statute, then it is not a proper EOCA charge.


There are two overarching elements that are necessary to establish guilt in an EOCA charge: (1) that the defendant intended to establish, maintain, participate in, or participate in the profits of a combination3; and (2) that the defendant committed or conspired to commit one of the enumerated predicate offenses found in Tex.Pen.Code § 71.02(a), which also needs to be listed in the indictment.4 Simply put, the defendant must both agree to participate in the “combination” and “must himself perform an overt act in pursuance of that agreement.”5 The EOCA statute does not treat each predicate offense as an element for purposes of jury unanimity, regardless of whether the state alleges alternate predicate offenses with different degrees.6


There are two parts to the mental state required for an EOCA charge. First, the defendant must have the mental state that is required for the predicate crime.7 For example, if the defendant is charged with EOCA with theft as the predicate offense, the state must prove that the defendant intended to deprive the complainant of the property. Second, the state must prove that the defendant intended to establish, participate in, or participate in the profits of a combination.8 In other words, the defendant must possess more than just the intent to commit the enumerated predicate offense; he must also intend to commit the predicate offense as part of the combination. Also, the proof must consist of more than evidence that a combination existed and that the defendant committed one of the enumerated offenses.9 Thus, in our theft example, not only does the prosecutor have to prove that the defendant intended to steal, but also that he intended to steal as part of this crime ring, which is known as the “combination.” A jury may infer from any facts which tend to prove the combination’s existence, including the acts, words, conduct of the defendant, method of committing the crime, etc.10

To prove that the defendant intended to participate in the combination, the state must prove that the defendant intended to establish, maintain, or participate in a group of three or more in which the members work together in a continuing course of criminal activities.11 The defendant falls into the category of being part of the combination if the defendant, or one of his or her accomplices, engaged in ongoing criminal activities, and the defendant agrees to join the existing organized crime unit, knowing that it has committed or will commit multiple criminal activities.12

In O’Brien v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that for an adequate showing of “intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or the profits of a combination,” the “State must show that the predicate offense was committed as part of a collaboration of three or more people working together in a continuing course of criminal activities.13


“Conspiracy” as used in the EOCA statute differs from criminal conspiracy under Tex. Pen. Code § 15.02. A person “conspires to commit” for purposes of the EOCA statute when that “person agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of them engage in conduct that would constitute the offense and that person and one or more of them perform an overt act in pursuance of the agreement.”14 Criminal conspiracy, on the other hand, requires the prosecutor to prove that the defendant intended to commit a felony, agreed with one or more people to commit that felony, and that one of the people who formed this agreement committed an overt act in furtherance of that agreement. Criminal conspiracy does not require the defendant to have committed the overt act himself.15 EOCA “conspiracy” requires that the actor himself must commit an overt act in furtherance of the combination.16

A person may be guilty of criminal conspiracy by doing nothing more than agreeing to participate in the conspiracy, as long as another conspirator commits some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.17 For criminal conspiracy, if two people are charged and one is acquitted, the other must also be acquitted.18

EOCA conspiracy operates differently. To be guilty of conspiring to commit an offense as a member of a combination, a defendant (1) must agree to participate in the combination, and (2) must himself perform some overt act in furtherance of that agreement.19 That “overt act” need not in itself be criminal.20 A key difference between EOCA conspiracy and traditional criminal conspiracy is that when multiple people are charged in the combination, the acquittal of one of those people does not mean that a conviction on other defendants cannot stand.21


EOCA by “commission requires a showing of a collaboration in carrying on criminal activities in addition to the commission of one or more predicate offenses. [EOCA] by commission simply punishes a conspiracy involving three or more people that results in the completion of at least one of the conspired crimes.”22 EOCA by conspiracy does not require the state to show a completed offense.23 “When the state charges a defendant with [EOCA] by commission, it must show at least one completed offense. But in both types of offenses, the state still must prove the existence of a criminal combination.”24


One of the most often misunderstood requirements of the EOCA statute is the requirement that the state prove the intention of the members of the combination to carry out multiple criminal acts. Police officers and prosecutors often believe that a defendant may be charged with EOCA if that defendant were part of a group of three or more people who commit one of the crimes enumerated in the EOCA laundry list. While multiple people working together to commit a single crime may be guilty of that crime under a “law of parties” theory, those people cannot be found guilty of EOCA.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the phrase “collaborate in carrying on criminal activities” does not mean an agreement to jointly commit a single crime.25 The state must prove more than the defendant and some combination of his accomplices intended to act together toward a criminal objective of committing one of the enumerated crimes.26 The prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s accomplices had engaged in ongoing multiple criminal activities, and a defendant agreed to join the existing organized crime unit, knowing that it has committed or will commit multiple criminal activities, and that defendant committed an overt act, even if only one, in furtherance of that crime.27


The EOCA statute expressly excludes certain defenses. For example, it is not a defense that “one or more members of the combination are not criminally responsible for the object offense.”28 Remember, in EOCA cases your client is being prosecuted for belonging to this group that does bad things. He does not have to do the actual bad thing, so long as he does some “overt act” to help others do the bad thing. Also, as stated earlier, the fact that one member of the combination was acquitted does not mean that the other members of the combination are immune from prosecution.29 Finally, the fact that members of the combination change, and that the total number of people in the combination change is not a defense so long as the defendant and at least two other individuals remain in the combination.


Unfortunately, the law allows prosecutors wide latitude in creating complicated indictments with nightmare jury charges in EOCA cases. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has said that “[t]he jury must be unanimous that a defendant committed at least one of the enumerated offenses as a part of a collaboration to carry on criminal activities.”30 The court has made it clear, however, that the “jury does not have to agree on which specific offense was committed in an engaging case so long as everyone agrees that at least one of the listed offenses was committed as part of a collaboration in carrying out criminal activities.”31

For EOCA cases, the commission of each predicate crime constitutes a different manner and means of committing the single offense of EOCA.32 “An indictment may allege different methods of committing the same offense.”33 Therefore, a single EOCA indictment may list completely different predicate crimes as a “manner and means” of committing EOCA. For example, an indictment may charge an individual with committing EOCA by being part of a combination and then allege criminal activities as diverse as theft, money laundering, fraudulent use of identifying information, and murder. Although a single count can’t charge people with multiple crimes,34 courts have held that EOCA is one charge and can be pleaded with different predicate crimes as different “manner and means,” and each “manner and means” may be submitted to the jury.35 Further, verdict forms must be general so a properly written jury charge will not require the jury to make any determination as to which specific individuals in the combination committed which predicate crimes.36


Generally, the punishment range for EOCA is one degree higher than the most serious offense that was committed.37 If the predicate offense is first degree offense, then the minimum sentence is 15 years in the Texas Department of Corrections.38 There are provisions that make the range more aggressive when certain sex offenses are the predicate charge.39 Conspiring to commit an offense under the EOCA statute is the same degree as the most serious offense “that the person conspired to commit.” 40

At the punishment state of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he completely withdrew from the combination before the commission of the offense, and “made substantial effort to prevent the commission of the offense.”41 If the defendant proves this by a preponderance of the evidence then the punishment range becomes the same as the most serious offense listed in the indictment, or a degree lower if the defendant is convicted of conspiring to commit the offense.42

Importantly, a defendant convicted of EOCA is “not eligible for release on parole until [the defendant’s] actual calendar time served, without consideration for good conduct time, equals one-half of the sentence or 30 calendar years, whichever is less, but in no event is [the defendant] eligible for release on parole in less than two calendar years.”43


The EOCA statute can be tricky and confusing to the untrained eye. Many police officers and prosecutors wrongly believe that if a person commits a crime with at least two other people, then that person is guilty of EOCA. As shown above, this is not the case. When attacking the State’s case pay close attention to the pleadings. Consider filing motions to quash when the state’s indictment does not identify an “overt act” and have the statute and supporting case law ready to cite when it comes time to move for a directed verdict when the state fails to present evidence of the defendant’s intent to be part of a collaboration of three or more people working together in a continuing course of criminal activities. While the complexities of the EOCA statute aid the state in some respects, those same complexities create many opportunities for the state to make mistakes. This, in turn, creates opportunities to “recover a fumble” when the defense lawyer pays close attention to the statute’s details.

1 2 3 6