Many of our clients are dismayed to learn that they face charges in federal and state court for the same exact conduct or for relevant conduct. Fortunately, the federal sentencing guidelines provide that where the state offense “is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under the [relevant conduct provisions], the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the anticipated term of imprisonment.” (emphasis added). U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 Comment n. 3. So problem solved, right?
Not exactly. If the client was taken into federal custody on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, even if the judge sentences him to “concurrent time” with the state offense, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) might not give him credit for all of the time spent in federal custody awaiting sentencing. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 973 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2020) provides important guidance on how to ensure that clients awarded concurrent sentences for federal and state charges actually receive full credit for that time.
Importantly, Taylor recognized that district courts wishing to award credit for time served while awaiting sentencing should not attempt to award “credit,” and should not state a commencement date for the federal sentence earlier than the date of federal sentencing. They should instead reduce the sentence by the amount of time the defendant has been in federal custody awaiting sentencing. Judge Wiener’s opinion reads, in part, as follows:
An Overview of the Case
Defendant-Appellant Tyvon Taylor appeals the 120-month sentence imposed by the district court following his plea of guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Taylor contends that: (1) The district court erred when it attempted to reduce the length of his sentence either by ordering that the sentence commence on a particular date or by ordering that he be given credit for time served, and (2) The sentence imposed by the district court is impermissibly ambiguous because the pronouncement that it “run concurrently with any sentence imposed by state authorities” does not specify with which state sentence or sentences, corresponding to four pending state court charges, the federal sentence will run concurrently.
We conclude that the district court’s attempted reduction of Taylor’s sentence was ineffectual and order a limited remand for the district court to consider, and state on the record, whether that court would have imposed the same sentence regardless. We also conclude that the sentence imposed is ambiguous because it fails to identify the specific state sentence or sentences with which the federal sentence will run concurrently. We therefore order a limited remand for the district court to consider, and state on the record, whether that court would have imposed the same sentence knowing of the ambiguity.
The Federal Charges
In June 2018, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Taylor with being a felon in possession of two firearms, viz. a .40 caliber Springfield Armory pistol and a Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol, beginning on or about August 12, 2017, and continuing until on or about August 15, 2017. In October 2018, Taylor pleaded guilty, and the district court ordered the preparation of a presentence report (PSR).
The “offense conduct” section of the PSR includes information about Taylor’s involvement in shootings on August 12 and 13, 2017. That section of the PSR also includes information regarding an August 15, 2017 traffic stop of a vehicle in which Taylor was a passenger during which officers found Taylor in possession of firearms.
The PSR reflects that, during the August 12, 2017 incident, Shreveport (Louisiana) Police Department officers responded to a shooting and located a victim suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. That victim identified Taylor as his assailant. Investigators located .40 caliber and 9mm caliber shell casings at the scene.
The August 13, 2017 incident involved officers responding to a call of shots fired and observing an empty vehicle crashed into a light pole. The PSR noted that investigators located spent shell casings and live rounds in and around the vehicle. The owner stated that Taylor had borrowed the vehicle. Taylor was identified as the person driving and shooting from the vehicle prior to the crash and was observed fleeing from the vehicle prior to the arrival of the police.
As for the August 15, 2017 traffic stop, the PSR recounted that, after procuring an arrest warrant for Taylor, police had arrested him during a traffic stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. The driver of the vehicle stated that once police attempted to initiate the stop, Taylor had pointed two handguns at him and accused him of setting up Taylor. As noted, police located a Smith and Wesson 9mm handgun and a .40 caliber Springfield Armory handgun in the vehicle. The analysis conducted on the two firearms in Taylor’s possession at the time of his arrest determined that they matched shell casings found at the scenes of the August 12 and August 13 shootings.
The Pending State Charges
The PSR also listed four pending state charges:
(1) July 31, 2017 (case number 351,576) related to possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon and illegal use of weapons during violence;
(2) August 12, 2017 (case number 351,577) related to attempted second degree murder and possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon;
(3) August 13, 2017 (case number 351,999) related to illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities and possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon; and
(4) August 15, 2017 (case number 351,578) related to possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon.
Taylor’s Sentencing Memorandum
Taylor did not object to the PSR, but he did file a sentencing memorandum in which he requested that his sentence be at the low end of the guidelines range and run concurrently to any sentences imposed in the four pending state court charges, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c):
If … a state term of imprisonment is anticipated to result from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction under provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the anticipated term of imprisonment.
Taylor’s Request at Sentencing
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked “the Court to specifically give Mr. Taylor the credit for time served from the date he was taken into federal custody, which is the July 9 of 2018 date.” Defense counsel noted that Taylor had already served nine or ten months on the state court charges prior to that date, and he speculated that the Bureau of Prisons would not credit Taylor for that time in state custody. Defense counsel suggested that the district court “go back and make the sentence retroactive to the July 9 of 2018 date.”
District Court’s Pronouncement of the Sentence
The district court observed that the guidelines sentence had been substantially increased because of the relevant conduct but determined that the application of the attempted murder guideline was appropriate. The court sentenced Taylor to the within-guidelines statutory maximum of 120-months imprisonment and a three-year period of supervised release.
In pronouncing the sentence, the district court stated, “[t]he judgment in this particular matter will show that this sentence is to run concurrently with any sentence imposed by state authorities on the conduct described, and this Court will begin the federal sentence as of the time he is taken into federal custody, which is July 9, 2018.” The written judgment provides, “[t]his sentence shall run concurrently with any sentence imposed by state authorities on the conduct described. Defendant shall receive credit for time served from July 9, 2018.” At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to the sentence to the extent that the statutory maximum sentence deprived Taylor of the benefit of a guilty plea.
Taylor’s Arguments on Appeal
Taylor here takes issue with the sentence imposed by the district court for two reasons. He first contends that the district court erred when it attempted to reduce the length of his sentence either by giving him credit for time served in federal custody prior to the sentencing (as did the oral pronouncement) or by commencing his sentence retroactively (as did the written judgment). Taylor also claims that the sentence is impermissibly ambiguous because it does not specify with which state sentence or sentences (corresponding to the four pending state court charges) the federal sentence will run concurrently. Taylor requests that we vacate his sentence and remand to the district court to permit that court to: (1) consider reducing his federal sentence by an amount equal to the period of time he served in federal custody prior to being sentenced and (2) clarify with which state sentence or sentences his federal sentence will run concurrently.
Taylor Invited the District Court’s Error
Taylor invited the district court’s error with respect to the backdated commencement of his sentence and the credit for time served in federal custody prior to being sentenced. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked “the Court to specifically give Mr. Taylor the credit for time served from the date he was taken into federal custody … July 9 of 2018.” Defense counsel also suggested that the district court “go back and make the sentence retroactive to the July 9 of 2018 date.”
“The Fifth Circuit will not reverse on the basis of invited error, absent manifest injustice.” Manifest injustice occurs when the district court’s “error was so patent as to have seriously jeopardized the rights of the appellant.”
Taylor Argues that Manifest Injustice Occurred
Taylor insists that a manifest injustice occurred because (1) the district court intended to reduce his sentence by the number of days he served in federal custody prior to being sentenced and (2) the ineffectual sentence fails to do so. In the oral pronouncement of the sentence, the district court stated, “this Court will begin the federal sentence as of the time [Taylor] is taken into federal custody, which is July 9, 2018.” The written judgment provides, “Defendant shall receive credit for time served from July 9, 2018.”
What the District Court Should Have Done
The district court is not permitted to compute the credit for time served or to order the backdated commencement of a sentence. The BOP alone is authorized to take these actions. If the district court intended to award Taylor credit for the time he served in federal custody prior to being sentenced, that court should have reduced his sentence accordingly and noted the reason for the reduction in the judgment. (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit Orders Limited Remand on the Length of the Sentence
Although the limited remand is a seldom-used practice in this circuit, we deem that procedure warranted in a case such as this. It is not apparent here that the defendant was harmed by an error because it is not clear whether the district court would have acted differently had it known of the error. We order a limited remand so that the district court may consider, and state on the record, whether it would have imposed the same sentence knowing that it could not order either that (1) the commencement of Taylor’s sentence be backdated or (2) Taylor receive credit for the time he served in federal custody prior to sentencing. If on remand the district court clarifies that it would not have imposed the same sentence, then the error Taylor invited is manifest, and we would vacate Taylor’s sentence and remand for resentencing. If, on the other hand, the district court indicates that it would have imposed the same sentence even knowing the limitations regarding the commencement of the sentence and credit for time served, then we would conclude that no manifest injustice occurred and would affirm the sentence.
The Fifth Circuit Orders Also Orders Limited Remand on the Concurrent Nature of the Sentence
We conclude that the district court committed an obvious error when it imposed an ambiguous sentence that fails to specify with which of the state sentence or sentences the federal sentence will run concurrently. But it is not clear whether the ambiguous nature of Taylor’s sentence affected his substantial rights, so we order a limited remand for the district court to clarify, and state on the record, whether it would have imposed the same sentence had it known of the ambiguity.
Conclusion
We order a LIMITED REMAND to the district court to consider, and state on the record, whether it would have imposed the same sentence knowing that: (1) it could not effectively order the backdated commencement of Taylor’s sentence, (2) it could not effectively order that Taylor be given credit for the time he served in federal custody prior to being sentenced, and (3) the sentence is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. We retain jurisdiction over this appeal pending the district court’s answer to our inquiry.
My Thoughts
- Clarity is key to ensuring that our clients receive credit for concurrent time.
- Asking the Court to reduce your client’s sentence by the amount of time awaiting federal sentencing is not a downward departure or a variance. Rather, it is an adjustment contemplated by the guidelines, and now by the Fifth Circuit. See United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.3, Comment n. 2(C).
